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CRIMINAL LAW’S CORE PRINCIPLES
PAUL H. ROBINSON
ABSTRACT
Modern criminal law scholars and policymakers assume they
are free to construct criminal law rules by focusing exclusively on
the criminal justice theory of the day. But this “blank slate”
conception of criminal lawmaking is dangerously misguided. In
fact, lawmakers are writing on a slate on which core principles
are already written and realistically they are free only to add
detail in the implementation of those principles and to add
additional provisions consistent with them. Attempts to do
otherwise are destined to produce tragic results from both
utilitarian and retributivist views.
Many writers dispute that such core principles exist. It is a
common view that people’s justice judgments are personal to
them or perhaps to their small group. If this were true, it would
present an obstacle if not a permanent barrier to the creation of
a criminal code that has legitimacy and moral credibility for those
it covers. But an investigation of the evidence from a wide variety
of sources suggests that there is a set of core principles upon
which humans generally agree.
This article examines six potential indicators of core
principles: principles on which empirical studies suggest a high
level of agreement across demographics within society, principles
on which empirical studies suggest agreement cross-culturally,
principles emerging early in the historical development of formal
criminal law, principles reflected in the universal path of child
development, principles reflected in the behavior of social
animals, and rules and principles regularly appearing in natural
experiments of human groups beyond the reach of the law. I
identify nine principles with support from most or all of these
sources and that properly qualify as near universal core
principles.
One might speculate about why such core principles exist,
and the article does, but whatever the reason—be it an
evolutionarily created genetic predisposition or a process of
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generalized learning common to all social groups—the existence
of such core principles has important and diverse practical
implications: in suggesting reduced crime-control effectiveness
where the criminal law conflicts with a core principle, in setting
limitations on and strategies for social reform, in supporting a
broader use of restorative justice, in suggesting a more nuanced
application of the legality principle, in supporting the recognition
of a general mistake of law defense and a mitigation for partial
excuses, in assessing the feasibility of creating an international
criminal law or of creating a criminal law for a territory now
being created whose population does not yet exist, and even in
planning initial contact with extraterrestrial beings.
___________
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern criminal law scholars and policymakers appear to assume that
they are free to construct criminal law rules by focusing exclusively on the
criminal justice theory of the day. This “blank-slate” conception of criminal
law drafting displays itself in a stream of criminal law rules and practices
that dramatically break with prior practice but that logically follow from
current theory. In the 1970s, policymakers felt comfortable with imposing
an automatic life sentence for a minor repeat offense, such as a $120 air
conditioning fraud, as approved by the Supreme Court in the 1980 Rummel
case, because, under the theory of the day, such treatment of habitual
offenders promoted general deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous.1
This same blank-slate attitude is reflected in the comfort with which today’s
progressive policymakers seek to decriminalize minor thefts and assaults2
or, indeed, to abolish punishment altogether.3
This article shows, however, that this blank-slate conception of
criminal lawmaking is false and dangerously misguided. Lawmakers are not
writing on a blank slate and ought not feel free to formulate any rule
supported by the popular theory of the day. Rather, lawmakers are drafting
criminal codes on a slate where the core principles are already written.
Realistically, they are free only to add detail in the implementation of those
principles and to add additional provisions not inconsistent with them.
But do there even exist such universally shared “core principles” of
criminal law? A wide range of writers claim no.4 Instead, it is a common

1.
See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
2.
In Suffolk County, Massachusetts, prosecutors are ordered not to bring charges for 15
crimes, including shoplifting, larceny under $250, and threats. CHARGES TO BE DECLINED, ROLLINS 4
DA, https://rollins4da.com/policy/charges-to-be-declined/ [https://perma.cc/3PGY-FRWS]. In
Philadelphia, retail theft under $500 is no longer a misdemeanor but a summary offense in the eyes of
prosecutors. Maura Ewing, Philadelphia’s New Top Prosecutor Is Rolling Out Wild, Unprecedented
Criminal Justice Reforms, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:47 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/03/phillys-new-top-prosecutor-is-rolling-out-wild-unprecedented-criminal-justicereforms.html?wpsrc=sh_all_dt_tw_ru [https://perma.cc/G46V-YHXC]. In Cook County, Illinois
prosecutor Kim Foxx announced she would not prosecute shoplifting as a felony unless the items stolen
totaled more than $1,000 or the person charged had at least 10 prior felony convictions. Steve
Schmadeke, Top Cook County Prosecutor Raising Bar for Charging Shoplifters with Felony, CHI. TRIB.
(Dec. 15, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-kim-foxx-retail-theft1215-20161214-story.html. In Dallas, policy reforms “included a decision not to prosecute thefts of
personal items under $750 that are stolen out of necessity.” Catherine Marfin, Texas Prosecutors Want
to Keep Low-level Criminals out of Overcrowded Jails. Top Republicans and Police Aren't Happy, TEX.
TRIB. (May 21, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/21/dallas-district-attorneyjohn-cruezot-not-prosecuting-minor-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/KRP4-TT5D].
3.
“Punishment is never fated to ‘succeed’ to any great degree.” A society that “intends to
promote disciplined conduct and social control will concentrate not upon punishing offenders but upon
socializing and integrating young citizens – a work of social justice and moral education rather than
penal policy.” DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 288-89 (1990).
4.
See, e.g., Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace,
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view that people’s justice judgments are “deeply culturally contingent”5 and
that there is “enormous variation” in global views about crime and
punishment.6 Others argue that “. . . there is a huge amount of cultural
variation in the real-world application of justice intuitions.”7 Some writers
believe that some people may agree on some things, typically in extreme
cases, but otherwise see no shared intuitions of justice.8
This Article will show that there are indeed universal principles of
criminal liability and punishment that ordinary people share and, further, for
good utilitarian and retributivist reasons, ought not be violated and, as a
practical matter, cannot be altered. Further, recognizing the existence of
these core principles provides a wide range of insights concerning the
proper formulation and reform of criminal law.
How might one demonstrate the existence of such core principles of
criminal liability and punishment? Part II identifies a wide variety of
sources , including studies of high agreement levels within a society for
certain principles, studies showing high cross-cultural levels of agreement,
evidence showing the universal path of child development, animal studies
that show precursors to such human justice judgments, historical review of
the principles and doctrines that emerged earliest in formal criminal law,
and the emergence of common principles regularly adopted by groups
caught in “natural experiments” beyond the reach of law. Drawing on these
many different sources, and especially on the strong overlap among them,
Part III offers and documents a series of core principles suggested by the
sources in Part II.
If such core principles exist, one may wonder how this could possibly
be so, given that judgments of justice seem so complex and concern such
nuanced matters. One might think that people’s views on such issues would
be influenced primarily by their life experiences. Cultural, economic,
religious, familial, educational, social, political, and emotional forces could

Pluralism, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 858
n. 179 (2006) (“The complex beliefs that underwrite retributive justice are common to most criminal
justice systems, but they are neither universal nor self-evident.”); DAVID CHUTER, WAR CRIMES:
CONFRONTING ATROCITY IN THE MODERN WORLD 94 (2003) (“[I]nternational criminal law’s
vocabulary and concepts are not neutral. They are culturally specific, constructed and manipulated by a
very small number of countries. . .”); Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments and International Crimes:
The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 637 (2012) (“. . . [D]espite some level of uniformity of
global views toward crime and punishment, there is also evidence of enormous variation—enough
variation to threaten the legitimacy of an institution that claims to enforce universal norms.”).
5.
Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass
Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 551 (2005).
6.
Woods, supra note 5.
7.
Id. at 651
8.
“[E]veryone may agree that five years in prison is unjustly harsh desert for shoplifting, or
that a five dollar fine is unjustly lenient desert for rape, but beyond such clear cases our intuitions seem
to fail us. Is two years, five years, or ten years the proper sanction for a rape? . . . Our sense of just
deserts here seems to desert us.” Leo Katz, Criminal Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 80, 80–81 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
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be powerful influences on people’s judgments of justice. For core principles
to exist, their source must be something more powerful than any of these
combined life experiences and influences. What could that source of
common influence possibly be? Part IV hypothesizes a human
predisposition toward accepting such core principles, a predisposition that
was evolutionarily advantageous because acceptance of the core principles
within a human group was a prerequisite for maintaining group cooperation
essential to the success of the human species.
Whatever the reason for their existence, the fact that core principles do
exist has significant practical implications for a modern society. As Part V
explains, the existence of core principles can have an effect in determining
the best distributive principles for criminal liability and punishment, in
setting strategies for using criminal law to change societal norms, in
formulating specific criminal law doctrines, and in assessing the feasibility
of having a criminal law that governs many different communities, such as
federal criminal law or even international criminal law.
II. SIX POTENTIAL INDICATORS OF CORE PRINCIPLES
Each of the following categories of sources or indicators can suggest
the existence of a core principle. These sources—historical, national, and
international empirical surveys, child development, animal studies, and
natural real-world experiments—are dramatically different in nature. A
principle suggested by most of these sources would seem to suggest some
depth of support, perhaps enough to suggest that the principle is shared by
humans generally. After the introduction of these six sources here, Part III
uses these sources to identify what might be near-universal core principles.
A. Principles on Which There is High Agreement within Society
Empirical evidence of widespread agreement on a principle would
seem to be direct support that the principle is near universal. As
demonstrated in Part III, the empirical evidence suggests a strong agreement
on a wide variety of liability and punishment issues across demographics.
Research conducted by Robert Kurzban demonstrated just how
nuanced these shared intuitions of justice are.9 In one study, participants10
were given twenty-four short scenarios on separate cards and were asked to

9.
Paul H. Robinson & Robert O. Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice,
91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007).
10.
Id. at 1871-72, n.183 (Here is what the participants looked like as a group – Gender: 36%
male, 64% female; Marital status: 23% single, 58% married, 9% divorced, 8% widowed; Have children?:
70% yes, 30% no; Race: 91% white, 9% nonwhite; Education: 5% some college, 2% two-year college
degree, 38% four-year college degree, 39% masters degree, 17% doctorate / professional degree).
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rank-order the cards to reflect the amount of punishment deserved in each.11
The scenarios included such offenses as theft by taking, theft by fraud,
property destruction, assault, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, rape, negligent
homicide, manslaughter, murder, and torture in a variety of situations,
including self-defense, provocation, duress, mistake, and mental illness.
The kinds of offenses in the scenarios represent 94.9% of the offenses
committed in the United States.12 The study demonstrated that shared
intuitions regarding the relative seriousness of wrongdoing were very
strong. The amount of agreement shown in the study—96% of all pairwise
judgments, and a Kendall’s W of 0.95—represents an extraordinary result.
In a follow-up study conducted online, we again found an extraordinarily
high level of agreement, despite the potential for a large increase in the
amount of “noise” due to the format of the study.13
B. Principles on Which There is Agreement Cross-Culturally
Also useful are studies of agreement on intuitions of justice that extend
beyond a single society or nation. There exist vast differences in ecology,
history, demographics, social structure, and many other variables from one
group or culture to another. These differences are so striking and of such a
nature that it seems odd that all groups would adopt the same justice norms.
That is, it might seem surprising that dramatic differences in social structure
and social resources would have no effect on existing justice judgments.
Consensus on a justice principle despite the significant differences
across cultures seems indicative of a principle that stems from some deeper,
biologically rooted human intuition.14 For instance, cross-cultural empirical
evidence appears to support the view that people everywhere share some
intuitions about the relative blameworthiness of serious wrongdoing. One
such study, conducted by Graeme Newman, sampled 2,360 individuals from
several different countries—India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, United States, and
Yugoslavia—chosen for their supposed important cultural differences.15
Subjects were asked to rate certain serious offenses on a 12-point scale.16
Newman reports that “[a]t the general level of analysis, it is apparent that
there was considerable agreement as to the amount of punishment

11.
12.

Id. at 1867.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003
STATISTICAL TABLES 14 tbl.1 (2005).
13.
Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 9, at 1871.
14.
See generally, RICHARD ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS (1987);
ROBERT NOZICK & WILLIAM FITZPATRICK, TELEOLOGY & THE NORMS OF NATURE (2000); KWAME
ANTHONY APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS (2010); DAVID ENOCH, TAKING MORALITY SERIOUSLY
(2011); ALLEN BUCHANAN, OUR MORAL FATE, EVOLUTION AND THE ESCAPE FROM TRIBALISM (2020).
15.
GRAEME NEWMAN, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN SIX CULTURES
140 (1976).
16.
Id. at 116 tbl.4.
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appropriate to each act” and that looking at relative rankings indicates
“general agreement in ranks across all countries.”17
C. Principles Emerging Early in the Historical Development of Formal
Criminal Law
A principle that appears early in the historical record and remains
accepted today would seem to be a good candidate for a core principles list:
it is telling that, even in a world with little legal sophistication or precedent,
long-ago generations felt strongly enough about the principle to articulate it
on their own. Also, because it appeared early, its widespread acceptance
cannot be attributed to generations of internalization. Take, for example, the
right of self-defense. This right was recognized in the earliest criminal laws,
including the Code of Hammurabi, dating to about 1754 B.C.E. It was
similarly codified in a fourth century C.E. Roman law which stated, “we
grant to all persons the unrestricted power to defend themselves” (Iiberam
resistendi cunctis tribuimus facultatem).18 Other early sources of criminal
law principles drawn upon in this Article include the laws of ancient Athens
and early English law.
D. Principles Reflected in the Universal Path of Child Development
All humans develop according to a predetermined universal path that
includes not just predictable physiological milestones but also fixed timing
and content for the development of moral intuitions.19 This tends to support
the theory that certain principles of criminal law are innate to humans. In
the same way that baby teeth grow from gums and adult teeth replace baby
teeth, intuitions about morality and justice come online according to a
relatively predictable sequence. Furthermore, intuitions about injury, theft,
and fairness are among the first principles of justice understood by young
children.20 As suggested by Jerome Kagan, “temporal concordance implies
a biologically based preparedness to judge acts as right or wrong, where

17.
Id. at 140-41. (See tbl.12, pp. 142-43).
18.
Codex Justinianus 3.27.1. (Bruce Frier, ed., Cambridge 2016).
19.
See, e.g., Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2008)
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html (“The stirrings of morality
emerge early in childhood . . . .Though no one has identified genes for morality, there is circumstantial
evidence they exist. The character traits called ‘conscientiousness’ and ‘agreeableness’ are far more
correlated in identical twins separated at birth (who share their genes but not their environment) than in
adoptive siblings raised together (who share their environment but not their genes . . . . ) The moral
sense, then, may be rooted in the design of the normal human brain”).
20.
See Judith Smetana, Preschool Children’s Conceptions of Moral and Social Rules, 52
CHILD DEV. 1333, 1335-36 (1981) (Finding that preschoolers have a sense of the difference between
social conventions and moral rules. Pre-schoolers say that it would not be O.K. to hit another child in
their class for no reason even if their teacher allowed them to).
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preparedness is used with the same sense intended by linguists who claim
that two-year-old children are prepared to speak their language.”21
Imagine the reverse case. If there were no specific developmental
system for the acquisition of moral intuitions, if intuitions of justice were
simply a matter of general social learning, then the developmental route of
the acquisition of intuitions of justice would depend on the environment in
which a child developed. The things that the child learned to be wrong
would include acts the child witnessed, ideas communicated through
language, pedagogy from various sources, and so forth. Because these
elements are likely to differ widely across civilizations, cultures, and even
across family and peer groups within cultures, such a general learning
system would yield very different paths and timing in the acquisition of
intuitions of justice for different individuals.
Although evidence now suggests that moral reasoning develops
relatively early, it is likely that research still does not fully reveal the
precociousness of such reasoning. John Darley and Thomas Shultz suggest
in their broad review that “children are capable of making moral judgments
at a much earlier age than previously thought.” 22 Summarizing recent
literature, the authors conclude that “moral capacity is well developed
although by no means completely developed in the third year of life.”23 To
the extent that very young children have intuitions, acquire knowledge, and
make conceptual distinctions, especially universally, the probability that
each child acquires these by general learning processes decreases, and a
more innate developmental sequence becomes more likely.
E. Social Behavior and Practices Revealed by Animal Studies
Part IV describes how humans, as an ultra-social species, may owe
much of their success to embracing the core principles discussed in Part III.
As a social species, humans benefit when they have established agreed-upon
rules around, among other things, harming one another or taking another’s
property. If such basic principles were not universally accepted by humans,
then humanity would be internally destructive and less capable of advancing
as a species. Similarly, one might expect to find in other animals that exhibit
social behavior rudimentary forms of humans’ core intuitions about what
constitutes wrongdoing and the intuition that wrongdoing should be
punished. This is especially so among primates. In fact, several socially
cooperative species appear in some circumstances to exhibit these

21.
JEROME KAGAN, INTRODUCTION, IN THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG
CHILDREN x (Jerome Kagan & Sharon Lamb eds., 1987).
22.
John M. Darley & Thomas R. Shultz, Moral Rules: Their Content and Acquisition, 41
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 525, 552 (1990).
23.
Id.
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characteristics of “punishing” aggressors and cheaters according to some
basic principles of justice. Individuals that deviate from various group
norms and expectations are sometimes ostracized or aggressed upon by the
victims, the victim’s relatives, or others. And a number of researchers now
suggest that such behaviors may reflect a rudimentary moral sense or
intuition of justice.
For an example of an animal study that suggests that some animals,
especially those that depend on social groups, do have clear intuitions of
justice, consider the research of a widely reported experiment with capuchin
monkeys.24 Different combinations of monkeys adjacent to one another
regularly returned granite tokens in exchange for slices of cucumber. When
the experimenter began to provide one monkey in the dyad with a grape (a
more highly valued food) in exchange for the same token that continued to
yield mere cucumbers for the other monkey, the monkey receiving
cucumbers often manifested considerable distress. It sometimes jumped up
and down, throwing the token or the cucumber at the researcher, refusing to
eat the cucumber, and the like. This led the authors of the study to conclude
that capuchins can compare their own reward to the reward others receive
and will accept or reject rewards according to their relative value. An ability
to perceive inequities appears to underlie a great deal of social behavior in
primates, in whom transgressive acts are most systematically punished. But,
as discussed in Part III, these phenomena are not limited to primates or even
to mammals.
F. Rules and Principles Appearing in Natural Experiments of Groups
Beyond the Reach of Law
Today, we are surrounded by governmental law, but what would our
basic human nature be like without the state’s influence? Could we even
imagine a life without it? Luckily, the accidents of history and the
unpredictability of life give us some enlightening instances in which we can
glimpse humans living outside of the influence of law and society —cases
where a group is not only out of law’s reach but, they assume, will probably
remain so. Our world and our history are rife with such natural experiments,
most for which no one would volunteer, but survivors of such events can
tell us data-rich tales.25
A plane crashes on a remote mountain or a shipwreck s on an isolated
island. People might still conform out of fear that later they will be called

24.
Sarah Brosnan & Frans de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE 297 (2003);
Sarah Brosnan & Frans de Waal, Reply, 428 NATURE 140 (2004). See also Sarah Brosnan, Nonhuman
Species’ Reactions to Inequity and their Implications for Fairness, 19 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 153 (2006).
25.
See generally PAUL H ROBINSON & SARAH M ROBINSON, PIRATES, PRISONERS, AND
LEPERS: LESSONS FROM LIFE OUTSIDE THE LAW (Potomac 2015).
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to account by the law. If the group thinks it might soon be rescued, this is
no true test. But what if there is no realistic prospect of rescue; how do the
survivors deal with one another? Once they feel completely free of legal
constraints, how do isolated individuals behave with each other? Such
lawless situations have occurred in a variety of settings beyond plane
crashes and shipwrecks. A group may be forced into permanent isolated
exile, as with the forced creation of leper colonies in the middle of the
nineteenth century. Or a group may choose to isolate itself, as did groups of
pirates at the start of the eighteenth century.
Although there are dramatic differences between the situations and the
people in these lawless groups, there exist common patterns in the rules and
principles they create for themselves to define and punish wrongdoing. That
these groups, in such desperate circumstances, would adopt similar
behavioral principles to each other suggests that these cases offer another
source for identifying core principles that seem to be naturally shared by
most humans.
III. CORE PRINCIPLES
What core principles do these potential indicators suggest? Below are
nine principles that have independent support from the many different
indicators described in the previous section.
A. The Punishment Principle: Wrongdoing Deserves Punishment
The first principle suggested by the six indicators is the fundamental
shared belief that blameworthy wrongdoing deserves punishment. The
nearly universal nature of this principle is strongly supported by a wide
variety of the sources discussed in Part II.
Human civilizations as early as ancient Athens viewed wrongdoing
as giving rise to anger in the victim that could be assuaged only by
punishment. This anger was not, however, just from the personal sense of
wrong by the victim but also from the sense of wrong experienced by the
community. As Demosthenes argued in a public prosecution in the 360s
B.C.E.: “It’s not right that Meidias’ behavior should arouse my indignation
alone and slip by, overlooked by the rest of you. Not at all. Really, it’s
necessary for everyone to be equally angry!”26
The Punishment Principle is well documented by empirical studies,
both domestic and cross-cultural. One example is the so-called Ultimatum
Game, a study which tests respondents’ willingness to bear the costs to

26.
Danielle S. Allen, Demosthenes 21.123, in PUNISHMENT IN ANCIENT ATHENS, edition of
March 23, 2003, available at
http://www.stoa.org/demos/article_punishment@page=all&greekEncoding=UnicodeC.html
[https://perma.cc/C38J-UGMC].
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punish perceived unfairness. In the typical version, experimental subjects
are brought into the laboratory and randomly assigned to one of two
experimental “roles,” either that of the Proposer or that of the Responder.
The Proposer is provisionally allocated a sum of money called an
“Endowment,” often ten dollars. The Proposer suggests a split of the
Endowment with the Responder– for example, six dollars for the Proposer,
four dollars for the Responder. The Responder is then given the option of
accepting the offer– in which case the money is split as designated by the
Proposer– or of rejecting the proposal, in which case the ten dollars is not
given to the subjects.
Proposers generally offer between 40% to 50% of the Endowment to
Responders,27 but our interest is in situations in which Proposers offer a very
unequal split. Under these conditions, Responders often reject the proposals,
costing them the amount offered by the Proposer, and thus depriving the
Proposer of her portion of the money. Such rejections are interpreted by
researchers as cases in which Responders are punishing Proposers for
making unfair offers.28 This punishment happens under carefully controlled
conditions, when the subjects do not physically interact with one another,
do not know one another’s identities, and even when the experimenter does
not know the Responder’s decision.29. In short, people punish perceived
unfairness at a cost to themselves, even when there are no instrumental
consequences or experimenter expectations at work. Even more striking,
there is evidence that third-party observers with no stake in the game will
pay to punish Proposers they perceive as behaving intentionally unfairly
towards Responders.30
Another source of empirical evidence in support of the punishment
principle is the significant literature on “scenario research.” Where subjects
are asked their view on the amount of punishment that would be appropriate
for a particular offender, they rarely choose to give the offender no
punishment. For example, a study by Craig Boydell and Carl Grindstaff
gave participants the opportunity to indicate the penalty they believed
should be applied to an offense, as well as the appropriate minimum and
maximum penalty.31 Even for the least serious offense they investigated—
assault—a mere four percent of respondents indicated that the minimum

27.
This varies considerably depending on the details of the experimental procedure. See
COLIN CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 50-52
(2003).
28.
Id. at 10.
29.
See Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick, Anonymity Versus Punishment in Ultimatum
Bargaining, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 95, 111 (1995) (showing that punishment occurs even when
experimenters do not know subjects’ decisions).
30.
Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285,
S285-S300 (1986).
31.
Craig L. Boydell & Carl F. Grindstaff, Public Opinion Toward Sanctions for Crimes of
Violence, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 113 (1974).
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penalty they would apply is “no punishment.”32 For all other crimes, “no
punishment” was chosen as the appropriate penalty by fewer than four
percent of the respondents.33 Indeed, in the majority of cases, “no
punishment” was selected by no participants, even as the minimum
punishment for the offense.34
Similarly, a 1985 study allowed people to indicate “zero” in their
magnitude estimation task when questioned about the appropriate
punishment for certain offenses.35 The average value assigned for even the
offense judged least serious—“a person under 16 years old plays hooky
from school”—was greater than zero.36 On average, across all regions
investigated, even the least serious offense was judged to deserve some
punishment.
In many questionnaire studies, “no liability” was not an option given,
likely because the experimenters believed that all subjects would find that
all acts described in the study deserved at least some punishment.37 This
assumption itself is noteworthy, as it shows that a standard assumption made
by social science experts over the course of decades is that subjects would
obviously choose to apply at least some punishment. If all these researchers
were wrong, there likely would be evidence in the studies of subjects
refusing to assign punishment, by responding with only the minimum
possible amount of punishment in each case, or by responding randomly.
Yet these types of results did not occur, potentially vindicating the
researchers’ views.
Cross-cultural data suggest that questionnaire studies yield similar
results in all of the cultures that have been studied. While clearly there are
important cultural differences, the intuition that those who commit wrongs
should be punished seems to be universal. Cultural psychologist Paul Rozin
and his colleagues conclude that “[m]oral judgment and the condemnation
of others, including fictional others and others who have not harmed the
self, is a universal and essential feature of human social life.”38 Similar

32.
See id. at 114. (Note: The penultimate column, labeled “education,” is mislabeled and
should read “execution” (see p. 115 for a confirmation of this error) and should therefore not be
interpreted as a preference for “no punishment.”)
33.
Id. at 113-14.
34.
Id.
35.
MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY, app. A at
137 (1985) (the instructions read: “If you think something should not be a crime, give it a zero.”)
(emphasis in original).
36.
See id. at 158-61.
37.
See, e.g., Don C. Gibbons, Crime and Punishment: A Study in Social Attitudes, 47 SOC.
FORCES 391, 395 (1969) (For each of twenty offenses, there were roughly three hundred respondents.
Only four of the twenty offenses yielded more than 10% ‘no penalty’ responses. These were
homosexuality, statutory rape (consensual sex between a twenty-year-old and a sixteen-year-old), draft
evasion, and marijuana use).
38.
Paul Rozin et al. The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three Moral Emotions
(Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J.
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sentiments have been expressed by developmental psychologist Jerome
Kagan, who includes this intuition as one of a limited number of “universal
moral categories that transcend time and locality.” 39 Philosopher Ray
Jackendoff observes: “Thus in our culture, the legal system punishes not
only physical aggression like assault, but also economic aggression like
stealing.”40 Similar institutions are found in some form in every culture,
even in the absence of written legal codes. Anthropologist Donald Brown,
in his exhaustive review of the cross-cultural data, includes intuitions
surrounding justice and punishing transgressors as a “Human Universal.”41
The universal path of child development lends further support to the
Punishment Principle. From a young age, children demonstrate a belief that
wrongdoing is deserving of punishment. In an early and well-known
experiment, Judith Smetana tested very young children’s beliefs about
justice to determine if they believed wrongdoing– specifically, physical
harm (hitting) and theft (taking someone else’s apple),– should be
punished.42 Smetana used pictures indicating the acts to demonstrate
violations. To elicit responses, a pictorial scale (different-size frowns) was
used to gauge seriousness.43 Smetana also used a verbal assessment of how
harshly the offender should be punished: not at all, a little, or a lot.44 Both
groups of subjects—consisting of children between two-and-a-half to five
years old—indicated that hitting and theft were both serious offenses and
deserved punishment.45 The children indicated that these offenses would be
wrong even if “there [were] no rule about it.”46
Perhaps even more telling is the great lengths to which children are
willing to go in order to ensure that wrongdoers get the punishment they
deserve. Research has shown that children, like the adults in the Ultimatum
Game, are willing to make personal sacrifices, such as giving up stickers,
candies, or time playing on a slide, “to punish a transgressor who had acted
unfairly or unkindly.”47 This result is consistent among children across
cultures.48

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574 (1999).
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JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 118 (1984).
40.
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STRUCTURE 185-86 (2007).
41.
DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 138 (1991).
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See Smetana, supra note 20, at 1333-34 (1981).
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Judith G. Smetana, Toddler’s Social Interactions Regarding Moral and Conventional
Transgressions, 55 CHILD DEV. 1767 (1984).
47.
See Julia Marshall et al. Children Punish Third Parties to Satisfy Both Consequentialist
and Retributive Motives, 5 NATURE HUMAN BEHAV. 361, 361 (2020).
48.
Bailey R. House et al., Social Norms and Cultural Diversity in the Development of ThirdParty Punishment, 287 PROC. ROYAL SOCIETY B 287, 20192794 (2020).
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In fact, the Punishment Principle is so fundamental that it extends
beyond humans. Many socially cooperative species appear in some
circumstances to “punish” aggressors and cheaters.49 Individuals that
deviate from various group norms and expectations are sometimes isolated
or aggressed against by the victims, the victim’s relatives, and others.50
For example, within the highly social naked –mole-rat communities,
queens appear to focus attacks on lazy workers.51 In one social species of
wren, “helpers” assist by providing food when the young are being raised.52
Helpers experimentally removed from the group during that period are
usually attacked and harassed upon their return, while helpers absent at
other times of the year are never attacked.53 Wolves apparently refuse to
play with those who violate the social rule against injurious play-fighting,
and the latter both leave the group and die at higher rates than average.54
And young male deer who try to covertly have sexual intercourse with
females guarded by adult males are regularly attacked.55
Primates in particular exhibit sophisticated cooperation, which ranges
from simple reciprocal grooming and food sharing to complex tool-using
and coalitional behavior. They, too, regularly punish wrongdoers. In
chimpanzee societies, for example, those reluctant to share when they have
food are more likely to encounter aggressive responses when they later
approach those who have food.56 Chimpanzees will attack former allies who
failed to assist them in conflicts with third parties. Indeed, among
chimpanzees (which, along with bonobos, are the closest relatives of
humans), retribution is sufficiently common that researchers consider
retaliation an integral part of a system of reciprocity.57
Even in absent-law situations, group members create systems for
punishing wrongdoing amongst themselves. In the early 1840s, thousands
of families, motivated by a sluggish American economy and the prospect of

49.
See, e.g., Marc D. Hauser, Costs of Deception: Cheaters Are Punished in Rhesus Monkeys,
89 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 12137 (1992); Keith Jensen et al., Chimpanzees are Vengeful But Not
Spiteful, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 13046 (2007); Nichola J. Raihani et al., Punishment &
Cooperation in Nature, 27 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 288 (2012).
50.
See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CHANGING CULTURAL AND SOCIAL
NORMS
THAT
SUPPORT
VIOLENCE
6-10
(2009)
https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/norms.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2UG-EZNJ].
51.
Hudson K. Reeve, Queen Activation of Lazy Workers in Colonies of the Eusocial Naked
Mole-Rat, 358 NATURE 147, 148 (1992).
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Unrelated 259 PROCEEDINGS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 339, 341-42 (1995).
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54.
Marc Bekoff, Wild Justice, Cooperation, and Fair Play, 19 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 489, 493
(2004).
55.
PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 42 (2013).
56.
FRANS B. M. DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN
HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS 157–58 (1996).
57.
Id.

2021]

CRIMINAL LAW’S CORE PRINCIPLES

169

free land, traveled west from Missouri along the Oregon Trail.58 Wagon
trains formed in the winter in Independence, Missouri, where travelers
worked out agreements concerning who would lead the train, what supplies
would be brought, and how they would support the journey financially.59
There was no U.S. legal authority present, and the trains were not traveling
across U.S. territory during much of their travel. Each train made up its own
rules. At a rate of three miles per hour, a wagon train could make the twothousand-mile journey before the mountain passes were blocked by autumn
snowfall.60 Those trapped on the more rugged sections of the trail could die
without food or shelter. Nevertheless, one of the few things that would
prompt a train to voluntarily stop was the trial and punishment of serious
wrongdoing.61 Even unrelated trains were known to halt their journey so
that members could participate as jurors in another train’s trial.62
For a different kind of example, consider the prisoners in Nazi
concentration camps during World War II. During the War, the Nazis
rounded up and transported Jews, as well as homosexuals, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, communists, and gypsies from all over Europe into camps that
had been built expressly for the purpose of annihilating them.63 Those who
were not killed upon arrival fought to survive against disease, brutality,
starvation, and overwork.64
Prisoners in the camps commonly hid away small scraps of bread
among their possessions.65 The precious bread crusts could mean the
difference between life and death. Volunteers, at some significant personal
sacrifice, took turns staying up at night to stand guard.66 But the commitment
to catching and punishing those who victimized the weak was thought to
outweigh the personal cost.
There were some prisoners who mistreated their fellows or even
actively participated in torturing them, sometimes to death. The German SS
who controlled the camps were not inclined to punish such acts. In fact,
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59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

ROBINSON & ROBINSON, supra note 25, at 68.
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prisoners known to be cruel to their fellow prisoners were protected. Behind
the scenes, however, prisoner justice was at work, and the protected
“creatures” were often killed, commonly by prisoners who had not been
their victims, had nothing personal to gain, and put themselves at risk in
doing so. One of the malevolent prisoners, Gregory Kushnir-Kushnarev,
who claimed to be a former Russian general, was protected by the SS.67 But
when he fell ill and went to the camp doctor (a fellow prisoner), the doctor
by prearrangement declared him to be infectious and admitted him to the
hospital, where other prisoners killed him by lethal injection. This kind of
personal sacrifice in order to impose deserved punishment, even by persons
unrelated to the victim, appears regularly in law-less situations.68
There have been multiple attempts at creating “no-punishment”
societies. For instance, during the 1960s social revolution, some established
anti-punishment communes in order to prove to the world that people could
live together in an open society that maximized autonomy while protecting
the rights of others. One of the most famous of these communes was Drop
City, established in May 1965 on six acres of scrubland outside of Trinidad,
Colorado.69 The commune became a rich incubator for artistic and social
creativity, including the development of geodesic domes made from junk
car hoods as living quarters. Open to all, there were no formal enforced
rules, but it was entirely appropriate for a member to complain to another
about how the person’s conduct hurt others.70
Things went well for a while, but when a member named Peter Rabbit
(most residents took new names) followed his own mind and dismissed
others’ complaints, the group’s inability to enforce its norms undid the
project.71 Peter Rabbit took the absence of enforcement as an opportunity to
promote his personal interests at the expense of others.72 On one occasion,
he was found eating a steak at a local restaurant using funds he took from
the communal bank account, an account to which he never contributed. As
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EUGEN KOGON, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HELL: THE GERMAN CONCENTRATION
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members increasingly resented his open thievery and their helplessness in
the face of it, they stopped cooperating and the commune collapsed.
As Drop City was disbanding, a different group established a nopunishment commune at Black Bear Ranch in Siskiyou County,
California.73 They, too, began with no enforced rules. But after a series of
fights, outbreaks of hepatitis, and a growing proportion of freeloaders,
formal rules were adopted and enforced by required appearances before the
community for open discussion. If the coercion of social stigmatization was
ineffective, the offending member was expelled. The Black Bear
commune’s adoption of a coercive enforcement system saved it, and it
continues to exist today. All no-punishment communes, like Drop City,
have failed.74
B. The Meaning of Wrongdoing
The previous principle lays out the punishment of wrongdoing, but is
there agreement on what constitutes wrongdoing? The indicators suggest at
least three near- universal aspects of the meaning of wrongdoing: physical
aggression, taking the property of another without consent, and deceit in
exchanges. As described below, the indicators also point to a near universal
acceptance of accomplice liability and a defense for otherwise wrongful
conduct necessary to avoid greater harm. As suggested earlier, additional
research may suggest other areas of agreement. This principle seems
particularly ripe for further development.
1. Wrongdoing Includes Physical Aggression, Taking Property without
Consent, and Deceit in Exchanges
Admittedly, there can be considerable variation in what types of
conduct are considered wrong across groups, cultures, and civilizations.
However, there does exist a core of conduct in which there is extraordinary
agreement on its wrongfulness: physical aggression and taking another’s
property without consent. These acts were forbidden in criminal laws as
early as 2300 B.C.E., when Uruinimgina, the King of the city-states of
Lagash and Girsu in Mesopotamia, took measures against murder, theft, and
usury among other conduct in the first example of a legal code in recorded
history.75
In empirical studies, offenses against persons and property are
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regularly chosen as being among the most egregious. Joseph Jacoby and
Francis Cullen surveyed a national sample of 1,920 adults who were read
eight crime vignettes during thirty-minute telephone interviews.76 The type
of crime in each vignette was taken from a list of twenty-four offenses. On
average, respondents agreed on the relative seriousness of each crime.
Assaults, rapes, robberies, and larceny (particularly of greater dollar
amounts) were all seen as deserving of significant punishment.77
The same result can be found in cross-cultural studies. For example,
Michael O’Connell and Anthony Whelan’s survey of 623 individuals in the
greater Dublin area showed that respondents viewed murder, assault,
burglary, and mugging as particularly wrongful.78 The same was found by
Marlene Hsu in Taiwan,79 and by Graeme Newman in India, Indonesia, Iran,
Italy, and Yugoslavia.80
Nor are these sentiments limited to adults. In Judith Smetana’s study
of young children’s beliefs about justice, discussed above, physical harm
(hitting) and theft (taking someone else’s apple) were clearly seen as forms
of wrongdoing to be punished.81 In another study, Elliot Turiel found that
most children believe the absence of a rule prohibiting stealing would be
wrong, and that “it would be wrong to steal even if the rule did not exist.”82
This nonrelativistic view, Turiel concluded, “corresponds to their
judgments about the act of stealing.”83
Physical aggression and theft were also commonly punished even
in absent-law situations. For example, residents of San Francisco, which
lacked a functioning government while it served as a base camp for the gold
rush in the mid-1800s, formed a vigilante court and grand jury for the
purpose of indicting and charging a criminal gang, the Hounds, with
“conspiracy, to commit murder, [and] robbery.”84 And in the Nazi
concentration camps mentioned above, prisoners who physically mistreated
or stole bread from their fellows were the recipients of prisoner justice, often
being killed for their wrongdoings.85
Finally, condemnation of physical aggression and theft can be found
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even in non-human species. In rhesus macaques, for example, those who
discover food and are caught having failed to alert the group to its discovery
often become targets of significant aggression.86 Elephant seal pups caught
trying to nurse from a female who is not their mother are not just shooed
away but often bitten severely and sometimes killed.87
In addition to physical harm and the taking of property, deceit in
exchanges is also universally understood as a wrong. Take the example of
children’s inclination towards fairness. Larry Nucci asserts that the crux of
early-childhood moral development is the construction of moral action tied
to structures of “just reciprocity.” 88 Further research shows that while young
children (age five or younger) are incapable of connecting effort or work to
reward (instead allocating rewards equally), children as young as thirteen
begin to allocate rewards with a proportionality (equity) rule, suggesting a
developmental trend in issues associated with exchange (effort for
reward).89
Social behavior in primates demonstrates that humans are not alone in
demanding fair exchange. inI the capuchin monkey experiment noted
earlier, what upset the capuchin was the perception that they were being
cheated in their exchange of a granite token for food, given the greater
reward that the neighboring capuchin was receiving.90 Similarly,
chimpanzees reportedly often refuse to participate in an exchange once
another chimpanzee is receiving a more valued reward for the same amount
of effort.91 Thus, both capuchins and chimpanzees behave in ways
suggesting that they can perceive unfairness in exchanges and that it often
agitates them.
Absent-law groups similarly show an inclination to punish not only
physical aggression and theft but also deceit in exchanges. In the San
Francisco gold mining camps mentioned above, for example, one of the
offenses prosecuted by residents was deception in a horse sale.92
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2. Assisting Another Person to Commit a Crime is Wrongful
Complicity and conspiracy became separate and distinct doctrines in
criminal law at least by the sixteenth century.93 The criminalization of
unlawful agreements by a group came early in common law but, “[i]t was
not until 1611 in the Poulterers’ Case, decided in the Court of Star Chamber,
that a mere agreement to commit a crime became a substantive offense.”94
The Poulterers’ Case is a landmark in the history of criminal conspiracy, for
it departed from the doctrine that the conspiracy must actually be carried
into effect before a writ of conspiracy would lie. The Court of Star Chamber
ruled in that case that the agreement was itself indictable though the offense
had not taken place.95 But legal accountability for the criminal conduct of
another was well-established even before there was a formal doctrine in
either tort or criminal law. As Francis Sayre explains, “[s]uch a doctrine
rests . . . rather upon natural reason and elementary principles of causation
than upon any fiction of law.”96
Absent-law groups also prosecuted those who were complicit in the
commission of wrongdoing. When the residents of the San Francisco gold
mining camps formed a committee to try the Hounds for their violence, the
Hounds were “indicted, and charged with a conspiracy, to commit murder,
robbery, etc.”97 The committee did not seek to charge each individual
Hound with specific crimes, but rather found that each member’s complicity
in the group’s activities sufficed to banish the group entirely.98
Empirical studies confirm near universal agreement that complicity
constitutes wrongdoing. Indeed, people’s judgments on these issues are
quite nuanced. People’s liability and punishment judgments alter
dramatically according to how much assistance an accomplice provides in
the commission of an offense. For example, in one study concerning
accomplice liability for a perpetrator’s killing during a store robbery, where
the accomplice agrees beforehand to the shooting, his punishment is thirty
years to life when the principal shoots the store owner.99 But if the
accomplice thought the principal’s gun would be unloaded, his liability is
only 6.6 years for the owner’s death.100 And if the principal shoots a co-
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felon rather than the store owner, then the surviving co-felon’s punishment
is only twelve months.101
Another study sought to test the subjects’ view of the minimum amount
that a person could contribute in encouraging or assisting an offense to be
held criminally liable for it. It also sought to test whether the subjects would
alter the degree of the liability they imposed according to the person’s
degree of contribution to the offense.102 The study presented subjects with a
series of scenarios, each of which presented a different degree of
contribution to a killing, including scenarios where the person attempted but
failed to assist.103 In order to test whether the subjects’ view depended upon
the actual occurrence of a resulting harm such as death, several of the
scenarios presented instances where the principal actor, the “perpetrator,”
was not successful in his attempt to kill. 104
As the involvement of the friend goes from a failed attempt to minimal
involvement up through masterminding of the crime, the liability ratings of
the respondents increase. The man who helps a woman in planning the
killing of her husband by directing her to a gun store is given an average
liability of five years, while the man who helps her by giving her his gun so
she does not have to go to the store gets an average of life imprisonment.105
But if he offers her his gun and she says she does not need it because she
already has one, then eighty-five percent say no punishment.106 That is, the
liability assignments to the friend increase as his contribution to the offense
increases.
3. Conduct Necessary to Avoid Greater Harm is Not Wrongful
What today might be called justification defenses, especially defensive
force justifications, were recognized early in the development of criminal
law. A right of self-defense against an unlawful aggressor is probably the
earliest recognized exception to the general prohibition against injuring or
killing another. The defense was recognized in the earliest criminal laws,
including the Code of Hammurabi.107
Roman law similarly codified the defense. Roman law was protective
of the individual’s right to defend himself and his property, whether from a
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thief on a darkened highway or a soldier in search of plunder. A provision
attributed to late fourth century C.E. reads:
We grant to all persons the unrestricted power to defend themselves
. . . , so that it is proper to subject anyone, whether a private person
or a soldier, who trespasses upon fields at night in search of plunder,
or lays by busy roads plotting to assault passers-by, to immediate
punishment in accordance with the authority granted to all. Let him
suffer the death which he threatened and incur that which he
intended.108
The offered rationale for the provision states, “[f]or it is better to meet the
danger at the time, than to obtain legal redress . . . after one’s death.”109
Empirical studies also demonstrate a common intuition that necessary
defensive force ought not to be punished. The control scenario in one study
involves a case in which a person is attacked with a deadly weapon and
responds by killing the attacker.110 Participants’ liability assignments in this
study were strikingly low, on average assigning well below one day in
jail.111 Of the respondents, seventy-one percent gave no liability; ninetyseven percent gave no liability or no punishment.112 This result confirms
that subjects give a defense to a person who kills under conditions that
satisfy today’s legal requirements for self-defense.
The right of self-defense was also recognized by absent-law groups in
determining liability and punishment. Recall the wagon train communities
discussed previously, who made and enforced their own rules. They dealt
with serious wrongdoing according to the group’s own shared intuitions of
justice. Abigail Jane Scott recorded a case in which her train delayed for a
day to participate in the trial of a man from a train ahead of them. The facts
presented at the trial revealed that Dunmore followed Olmsted, jumped him,
and began kicking him in the face. Olmsted called upon the bystanders to
pull him off. When no one intervened, he pulled a knife and stabbed the
attacker, killing him. The group judged Olmstead to be blameless and as
having acted in proper self-defense, and no liability was imposed.113
Children similarly view necessary harm as morally distinguishable
from malevolent aggression. In one study, Marc Jambon and Judith Smetana
sought to examine five- to eleven-year-olds’ judgments as to the
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justifiability of causing intentional harm to prevent greater injury.114 The
subjects were shown a series of colored drawings depicting a story where
an actor intentionally hurt his or her friend to stop the friend from
performing an act that would likely cause serious harm.115 The researchers
concluded that “with age participants offered increasingly more forgiving
evaluations of necessary harm.”116
C. The Blameworthiness Principle: Blameless Conduct Should Be
Protected from Criminal Liability
The indicators suggest that there is near universal agreement that
criminal liability and punishment ought to be imposed only where there is
some degree of blameworthiness for the wrongdoing. In modern terms, this
principle insists on some minimum level of criminal culpability (intention,
knowledge, recklessness, or negligence) as to the elements of the offense,
as well as a minimum level of cognitive and control capacity by the offender
at the time of the offense, which is typically provided through recognition
of a range of excuse defenses.
1. An Actor with No Culpable State of Mind as to the Offense is Not
Blameworthy
Even if an actor’s conduct is wrongful (the actor violates a criminal
law conduct rule), there is strong agreement that he ought not be criminally
liable and subject to punishment unless the violation was done with some
culpable state of mind. The distinction between willful and accidental
conduct was the earliest recognized distinction to a determination of
culpability.117 Early evidence of recognition of this distinction appears in
the Laws of Alfred over one thousand years ago:
Let the man who slayeth another wilfully perish by death. Let him
who slayeth another … unwillingly or unartfully, as God may have
sent unto his hands, and for whom he has not lain in wait, be worthy
of his life, and of lawful ‘bot,’ if he seek asylum. If, however, anyone
presumptuously and wilfully slay his neighbor through guile, pluck
thou him from my altar, to the end that he may perish by death.118
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Empirical studies confirm the continuing strength of this shared
intuition. In a culpability requirements study, subjects were given scenarios
containing instances of non-consensual intercourse, statutory rape, and
property damage offenses involving damage to a dwelling or to unimproved
property.119 In each scenario, the level of culpability of the person’s mistake
as to committing the offense varied. Where the offender was faultless in the
commission of the offense, the majority of subjects most frequently
imposed no liability or no punishment.120
Children as young as five or six years of age similarly view
wrongdoing as inherently different when committed unintentionally. In
reviewing several studies on the intent-accident distinction, Rachel Karniol
concludes that “children do evaluate actors who engage in intentional
negative acts as naughtier than those who enact accidental ones that result
in damage,” even where the children are “unable to explain the reasons for
their choice of which character is naughtier.”121
The absent-law cases also demonstrate a concern for imposing
liability and punishment only where there is culpability and cognitive
capacity of the offender. In the 1972 Andes plane crash, for example, a man
named Harley was discovered to have a private stash of toothpaste, which
normally was part of the group’s food stores (since it was coveted as a tasty
dessert).122 At his hearing, the group determined that Harley was misled by
another man, Delgado, who had told him that the toothpaste was not part of
the group stores and thus was fair game to trade.123 Harley’s plea, essentially
one of an honest mistake, was accepted by his peers and he was not
sanctioned.124
Or take the example of the crew aboard the pirate ship the Charles
II (rechristened the Fancy).125 After departing the Spanish port of A Coruña
and flying a newly fashioned flag bearing skull and crossbones, the
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mutineers made up their own laws.126 These outlaws deemed an offender’s
culpable state of mind relevant to deserved punishment.127 In one case, three
officers were found to have taken high quality clothing from the common
loot storage area in order to better seduce the women in town.128 Stealing
from the common loot was a serious offense normally warranting
punishment of death.129 Once they returned to the ship, the officers were put
on trial before the rest of the crew to answer for the theft charges.130 When
the officers explained that their intention had been to borrow the clothing
for the night and not to keep it, they were discharged with only a warning.131
The provision for a mistake defense appears to apply not only to a
mistake as to offense elements but also to a mistake as to the conditions that
would provide a justification defense. In the study of justification defenses
discussed previously,132 most people impose no punishment if the defensive
force seems unavoidable to the actor. On the other hand, if the person could
have safely retreated before using deadly force, subjects impose an average
punishment of 9.6 months.133 In comparison to 9.6 months, if the person
mistakenly believes that he cannot retreat, then he gets no punishment or
negligible punishment.134 In other words, not only do subjects almost
universally recognize the use of defensive force as not wrongful, but they
also tend to be quite sympathetic and forgiving when a defender makes a
mistake in the use of such force.
The sense of justice held by young children also incorporates the
question of whether an offender has made a mistake. When children aged
five and seven make judgments regarding blame, they consider the fact that
others might have beliefs different from their own.135 Their judgments are
quite nuanced. If a person’s belief is different than the child’s on matters of
fact—that is, beliefs concerning what is true (as opposed to what is morally
right)—then mitigation often is permitted. However, if the different belief
relates to what is right and wrong (for example, a teacher who thinks it is
acceptable to discriminate against someone based on gender), then the
person’s mistake does not exculpate him.136 This implies that children have
a sophisticated understanding of others’ beliefs and the role they play in the
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commission of moral offenses.137
2. An Actor Who Lacks the Capacity to Know His Conduct is Wrong or
to Avoid Committing it is Not Blameworthy
The second but related circumstance where blameworthiness is agreed
to be lacking despite the commission of a wrongful act is where the offender
through no fault of their own lacks sufficient capacity to understand the
wrongfulness of or to control their conduct. While the law and the
community commonly assume sanity, maturity, sobriety, and absence of
coercion, in the unusual case, a person may suffer a disability and its effects
may be such that he or she cannot reasonably be expected to have avoided
the violation.
The insanity and immaturity defenses were recognized as early as the
laws of Athens.138 As explained in Book IX of Plato’s Laws in 360 B.C.E.,
crimes may be committed
in a state of madness or when affected by disease, or under the
influence of extreme old age, or in a fit of childish [wantonness],
himself no better than a child. And if this be made evident to the
judges elected to try the cause, on the appeal of the criminal or his
advocate, and he be judged to have been in this state when he
committed the offense, he shall simply pay for the hurt which he may
have done to another; but he shall be exempt from other penalties . .
. . 139
General agreement on the propriety of providing such excuse defenses
is confirmed in many of the absent-law cases. Take the example of Michael
Privitiera, a.k.a. “Crazy Mike,” an inmate in the Attica prison known to be
unpredictably violent.140 Privitiera had been hostile towards the captured
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guards since the start of the Attica uprising, and he was brought before the
committee for attacking one of the hostages and assaulting an inmate in the
process, in violation of the group’s rules that would normally result in the
death penalty.141 The inmate committee found that because he was mentally
ill, he would instead be sent to temporary preventive detention.142
It may seem puzzling that in the midst of the Attica uprising chaos, the
committee’s judgments were not about punishment alone but rather about
just punishment. But empirical studies confirm that extrinsic forces as well
as the offender’s characteristics influence liability judgments that provide
excuse defenses. In one study, an individual who is characterized using
many keywords suggesting insanity picks up a dangerous object– such as a
baseball bat– and hits another person with it, killing him.143 The results
indicate that perpetrators who are judged to be suffering from a high degree
of dysfunction, whether of the cognitive or conduct control sort, are
normally not assigned criminal liability.
Beyond an offender’s individual dysfunctions, external pressures on an
offender can also be seen as a defense for punishable conduct. The bank
manager who lets burglars into the bank vault after hours because the
burglars have kidnapped his family is acting under a coercive force that will
reduce or extinguish his perceived blameworthiness. One study presented
subjects with scenarios of duress in which the level of coercion was
varied.144 Subjects generally refused to impose criminal liability or
punishment in those scenarios in which they judged the offender as
blameless for the offense because of the coercion.145
As the empirical studies show, all of these sources of dysfunction—
mental illness, involuntary intoxication, immaturity, and duress—can
undercut the blameworthiness required for criminal liability. Even in cases
where a complete excuse is not provided, the greater the dysfunction, the
greater the degree of mitigation (as we shall see in discussion of the
Proportionality Principle immediately below.)
Excuse defenses are also commonly recognized in situations where there
is no established law present. In 1822, one of the officers on a whaling ship,
Samuel Comstock, devised a plan to seize the ship, sail off to a Pacific
Island, and declare himself to be a pirate king.146 Comstock recruited several
other sailors on the ship, who joined him at a specified time to kill several
of the other officers as they slept. One officer, Gilbert Smith, was not with

CREDIBILITY GAP (2006).
141.
Id. at 102.
142.
Id. at 93.
143.
ROBINSON, supra note 55, at 336-46.
144.
Id. at 353-60.
145.
Id.
146.
WILLIAM COMSTOCK, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL COMSTOCK, THE TERRIBLE WHALEMAN 8793 (1840).

182

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW

[VOL. 14.1

the others, and before Comstock could kill him, he pledged allegiance to
Comstock on the condition that Comstock spare his life.147 Smith thereafter
managed the sailing of the ship and did not protest when another sailor was
hung for a crime that Smith knew the man had not committed. 148 Still,
months later, when the non-mutineers in the crew took back control of the
ship from Comstock, Smith was not punished, apparently on the theory that
he had been coerced to participate.149
D. The Proportionality Principle: The Extent of Liability and Punishment
Should Be Proportionate to the Extent of Wrongdoing and
Blameworthiness
Another principle that emerges from the six types of evidence is that
the extent of liability and punishment should be proportionate to the
offender’s wrongdoing and blameworthiness.150 This requires an
assessment of the seriousness of the offense as well as the culpable state of
mind and capacity of the offender. The indicators point to several specific
ideas demonstrating application of the Proportionality Principle: (1) greater
harm deserves greater punishment; (2) harm to persons is generally more
wrongful than harm to property; and (3) criminal liability should increase
with increased culpability levels and decrease with the reduced
blameworthiness of partial excuses.
1. Greater Harm Deserves Greater Punishment
One of the foundations of the Proportionality Principle is that relatively
more serious offenses are deserving of relatively greater punishment.
Support for this contention is vast.
Some of the most convincing evidence of the Principle’s near-universal
acceptance comes from empirical studies, both in the United States and
cross-culturally. A substantial body of research indicates a broad consensus
regarding the relative seriousness of different wrongdoings and the
appropriate relative amount of punishment. While some people may give
generally harsher punishment and others generally less harsh punishment,
people tend to agree on the relative degree of blameworthiness among a set
of cases. These studies confirm the existence of shared intuitions as to
relative seriousness of different variations on wrongdoing. The Robinson
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and Kurzban study showing almost complete agreement in the rank ordering
of twenty-four crime scenarios across all demographics, for instance, has
already been discussed in Section II.A.151
One of the most well-known studies is that of Thorsten Sellin and
Marvin Wolfgang, who in the 1960s surveyed 575 individuals across
Pennsylvania about the seriousness of fifty-one offenses.152 The subjects
were asked to both place offenses on a scale ranging from one to eleven and
to assign each offense a number, without any predetermined range, to
indicate the offense’s seriousness relative to bicycle theft, which was
arbitrarily assigned a value of ten.153 The results show broad agreement.154
The researchers conclude that “[t]he most strongly supported conclusion . .
. is that all the raters . . . tended to so assign the magnitude estimations that
the seriousness of the crimes is evaluated in a similar way, without
significant differences, by all the groups” and, further, that a “pervasive
social agreement about what is serious and what is not appears to emerge .
. . .”155
Since Sellin and Wolfgang’s work, there have been many other studies
using a variety of methods, all reaching similar conclusions. Alfred
Blumstein and Jacqueline Cohen surveyed 603 residents of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania.156 Subjects were asked to assign the length of a
prison sentence that “best fits the seriousness of the offense” for twentythree offenses that researchers presented in the form of brief crime
scenarios.157 The researchers found no strong effects of demographics—
including gender, race, religious affiliation, or level of education—on the
ordering of sentences.158 That is, different groups tended to agree on which
crimes should be punished more than other crimes. They concluded that
there was “considerable agreement across various demographic groups on
the relative severity of the sentences to be imposed for different offenses.”159
Lee Hamilton and Steve Rytina conducted face-to-face interviews with
391 subjects in the Boston area in which they asked subjects to rank each of
seventeen offenses in terms of severity using a task similar to the one
described above.160 A comparison of the individuals’ judgments of
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seriousness and desired punishments with the sample’s average
judgments gave high correlations—0.71 and 0.73, respectively—
suggesting “a high level of consensus.”161 An analysis of the demographic
differences among the subjects—age, race, income, and sex—showed no
strong effects.162
Similarly, Peter Rossi, Emily Waite, Christine Bose, and Richard Berk
interviewed 125 whites and 75 Blacks in Baltimore, Maryland with a
roughly equal number of males and females, asking people to categorize 80
offenses each into nine categories according to how serious the offense was
perceived to be.163 The correlations between ratings of Black and whites
people, males and females, and more and less educated groups were 0.89,
0.94, and 0.89 respectively, indicating a substantial amount of agreement.164
Charles Thomas, Robin Cage, and Samuel Foster surveyed 3334
households, asking subjects what they felt would be a “fair sentence” for
each of seventeen offenses.165 They reported finding “evidence of a
remarkable level of consensus, even after separating the sample on the basis
of their sex, race, age, income, occupational prestige, and educational
attainment.”166 They concluded that the findings, “regardless of the type or
category of offense examined, are not supportive of any prediction that
suggests variations between different categories of the population in either
perceptions of relative seriousness of these offenses, or the level of
sanctions that are viewed as appropriate.”167
In sum, in their review of the literature through 1997, Peter Rossi and
Richard Berk suggest that the studies converge on the view that people share
intuitions about the relative seriousness of wrongdoing.168 “[A] [f]airly
strong consensus exists on the seriousness ordering of crimes, with those
involving actual or threatened physical harm to victims generally
considered to be the most serious . . . .” 169 In fact, their summary of previous
studies suggests that “there is very little, if any evidence that there exist
subgroups within the American population with radically different views
about sentencing norms,” and that “[t]here is no evidence for a normative
order that is an alternative to what the overwhelming majority of the
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American population believe.”170
But these results are far from limited to the American population.
Cross-cultural evidence supports the view that people everywhere share
some intuitions about the relative seriousness of core wrongdoing. Included
here are three studies that are representative of the large body of literature.
A comparison of O’Connell and Whelan’s data on Irish subjects
with a British sample from a decade earlier found that, “Irish perceptions of
crime . . . have much in common with those in other jurisdictions,”
especially with regard to more serious crimes.171
Marlene Hsu administered a survey to 600 persons in Taiwan asking
for seriousness judgments of 14 offenses, which were the 14 index offenses
of Sellin and Wolfgang translated into Chinese, on an 11-point scale.172 Hsu
found similar ordinal judgments in the relative ranking of the 14 offenses
between the Taiwanese and American samples, with a coefficient of .84 (.95
among male subjects).173
Newman’s study of 2,360 individuals from a number of different
cultures—India (512), Indonesia (500), Iran (479), Italy (200), United States
(169), Yugoslavia (500)—revealed that, “[i]f one were to order the acts
according to the proportions of each country sample criminalizing them, one
would find a general consensus across all countries as to the extent that all
acts should be tolerated.”174 Newman also reports that “[a]t the general level
of analysis, it is apparent that there was considerable agreement as to the
amount of official punishment appropriate to each act” and that looking at
relative rankings indicates “general agreement in ranks across all
countries.”175
Studies suggest that even young children intuitively appreciate the
relative seriousness of different kinds of wrongful conduct, distinguishing
between more serious and less serious offenses. Marie Tisak and Elliot
Turiel gave children (average ages of the groups were roughly seven, nine,
and eleven) stories about acts that violated either moral rules (regarding
theft or pushing) or prudential rules (regarding running and falling).176
Subjects reported that the violation of the moral rule was more serious and
that it would be less acceptable to change moral rules.177 The comparison
between moral rules and prudential rules indicates judgments that go
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beyond consideration of consequences of rule-violating actions.
Substantial research demonstrates that the developmental sequence for
moral reasoning is not unique to the Western world. Larry Nucci suggests
that “there is considerable cross-cultural evidence that children and adults
across a wide range of the world’s cultures conceptualize prototypical moral
issues pertaining to fairness and others’ welfare in ways very similar to
children and adults in Western contexts, and differentiate such issues from
prototypical matters of convention.”178 In a recent review, Jenny Yau and
Judith Smetana concluded that despite cultural differences, “[c]hildren as
young as 3½ to 4 years of age have been found to treat moral transgressions
as very serious, generalizably wrong, and wrong independent of rules and
authority sanctions. In contrast, they treat conventional transgressions as
less serious, contextually relative, and contingent on rules and
authorities.”179
The absent-law groups also commonly assessed punishment according
to the relative seriousness of the violation. The rules adopted by the pirates
aboard the boat, the Revenge follow this pattern of having punishment track
the seriousness of the offense.180 A pirate who did not keep his weapons in
working order or “neglect[ed] his [b]usiness” would be “cut off from his
share.”181 A man who endangered the ship by smoking in bed would receive
“Moses law” (forty lashes).182 Because the pirates continued in their present
dangerous and burdensome occupation for the purpose of gaining wealth,
one of the most serious offenses was stealing from the group, which was
punished by marooning on an uninhabited island–essentially, a death
sentence.183
In addition to demonstrating the need for just punishment, absent-law
situations also shed light on human abhorrence of injustice—or of imposing
greater punishment than is deserved. In 1629, the sailing ship Batavia
wrecked on a coral reef off the coast of wild and unknown western Australia
on its journey from Amsterdam to the spice ports of Java. 184 The roughly
five-hundred-yard-long strip of coral rubble on which the almost three
hundred people aboard were caught was home only to seabirds and sea
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lions. The captain and crew took stock of the situation, and it became clear
to everyone that no help would be coming.
In keeping with the policy of the Dutch East India Company, as ranking
officer, Jeronimus Cornelisz was elected head of a committee, called the
Raad, that ran the affairs of the sudden community. His exercise of authority
brought order to the group, as tasks were assigned, and resources rationed.
But his autocratic style was perceived as producing unjust rules and
punishment. In one of the first disciplinary cases to come before the Raad,
a man had stolen food from the common stores and shared it with another
man. He was convicted before the Raad, and Cornelisz insisted that both
men be killed. The committee objected that the punishment was too severe,
especially regarding the man who had only shared in the food. The harsh
sentences may well have provided the intimidation that Cornelisz sought,
but they also hurt his reputation and added to the population’s increasing
doubts about his fairness and judgment.
If people were indifferent to notions of fairness and justice, the smart
move would have been to sign on at the start as an enthusiastic supporter of
Cornelisz, who had a monopoly on the existing resources and power. But
even then, most of the few hundred people on the island were put off by the
injustice of Cornelisz’s punishments and his unfairness in dealing with some
situations. Most refused to join his governing group, even though by doing
so they could have made their lives more tolerable and their long-term
survival more likely. Indeed, the majority of the survivors eventually
abandoned Cornelisz and his resources to take up a bleaker existence on a
nearby island where the primary draw was the group’s promise of just rules
and punishments.
2. Harm to Persons is Generally More Wrongful than Harm to
Property
Empirical studies have consistently demonstrated that people view
harm to persons to be more serious, and deserving of greater punishment,
than harm to property. In his review of the four decades of literature on
perceptions of seriousness following Sellin and Wolfgang, Setlioste
Stylianou concluded that “relative consensus seems to exist cross-culturally
with respect to behaviors that are generally ranked high on the seriousness
scale. … [T]heses” and that “[t] offenses are typically those involving
bodily injury, followed by those causing property damage or loss.”185
In the Rossi, Waite, Bose, and Berk study in Baltimore discussed
previously, the researchers concluded that “[c]rimes against persons,
especially murder, receive very high seriousness ratings. Crimes against
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property in which no action is taken against people are rated significantly
lower,” but still greater than “offenses often classified as misdemeanors,
e.g. ‘disturbing the peace,’ or ‘being drunk in public places.’”186
This intuition is not limited to adult populations. In a study performed
by David Elkind and Ruth Dabek, children were divided into groups based
on age (average ages of the groups were roughly five-and-a-half, seven-anda-half, and nine).187 The children listened to stories about different crimes
which varied in terms of whether the harm was to a person or to property.
The children then assessed blame and were asked about punishment. On
average, the children viewed damage to a person as more serious.188 These
results are mirrored in later work that suggests that while very young
children focus on either intention or harm, older children (age four and five)
use both harm and intention when making decisions about punishment. 189
Such conclusions strongly imply that by age seven children have
sophisticated views on desert and possess the ability to weigh multiple
factors.190
Findings also indicate that “children consider moral transgressions
resulting in physical harm to be more wrong than moral transgressions
resulting in property violations.”191 This suggests that children have
complex intuitions across different domains. Additional evidence comes
from studies in which children are asked to give examples of moral
transgressions. Children give physical acts of harm as the most common
examples. Acts of physical aggression are “prototypical” moral violations
to children.
The principle that harm to persons is more wrongful than harm to
property can also be ascertained by studying the degrees of punishment
doled out by absent-law groups. For instance, the San Francisco Vigilance
Committee, which, as discussed previously, sought to achieve just
punishment, would hang murderers but only banish robbers.192
3. Criminal Liability Should Increase with Increased Culpability Level
and Decrease with the Reduced Blameworthiness of Partial Excuses
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The third dimension of the Proportionality Principle involves taking
account of an offender’s culpability and capacity when determining
criminal liability. Culpability elements of offenses serve two distinct
functions: defining the minimum requirements for liability and
distinguishing different grades of a single offense. Where an offender
commits an offense with relatively greater culpability—say, purposefully or
knowingly—they deserve greater punishment. Where an offender acts with
lesser culpability, such as when acting recklessly or negligently, they are
less blameworthy and deserve correspondingly less punishment (or none at
all).
The idea that an offender’s liability and punishment ought to reflect the
offender’s degree of culpability is an old one. Plato, Aristotle, and other
ancient Greek philosophers and jurists distinguished between hekousios
(intentional) and akousios (unintentional) offenses.193 The modern theory of
mens rea itself can be traced as far back as Roman and Anglo-Saxon law
from the fifth century.194
Empirical studies confirm ordinary people tend to vary liability and
punishment with the level of culpability. In one study, John Darley and I
sought to determine the community’s views of the appropriate level of
culpability that should be required for various kinds of elements of different
kinds of offenses.195 Subjects were given six base scenarios - mistake as to
causing damage to a house, mistake as to causing damage to unimproved
property, mistake as to ownership of the house damaged, mistake as to
ownership of the unimproved property damaged, mistake as to lack of
consent to intercourse, and mistake as to age of the underage partner. In
each scenario, the level of culpability of the person’s mistake varied -among
knowledge, recklessness, negligence, and faultlessness. Subjects perceived
the four variations of each scenario as presenting distinguishable cases,
where liability and punishment increase as the manipulated level of
culpability increases.196
Cross-cultural studies confirm the view that people see offenses as more
serious when done intentionally rather than accidentally.197
Studies also show that children similarly view offenses differently
when committed with mitigating circumstances. In one study, John Darley,
Ellen Klosson, and Mark Zanna presented subjects, including first graders
and fourth graders, vignettes in which one child harmed another.198 Half the
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subjects also received information depicting either necessity, public duty,
or provocation, whereas the other half were presented with no such
mitigating circumstances.199 The researchers found that across the entire age
range, “each mitigating circumstance led to less recommended punishment
for the harm-doing act.”200
In another study, David Bersoff and Joan Miller presented third
graders, seventh graders, and college-age adults vignettes depicting offenses
such as harm to persons or damage to another’s property together with
potentially extenuating circumstances: absence of control, emotional
duress, or immaturity.201 Across age groups, the subjects tended to treat
actors as not accountable for accidental behaviors, and frequently absolved
them of accountability in cases involving absence of control and emotional
duress.202 The researchers concluded that “it appears likely that the common
developmental trend observed in the case of the anger duress breaches
reflects certain early features of young children’s conceptions of angerbased revenge as well as certain shared cultural views concerning the
disruptive interpersonal consequences of such action.”203
The principle of blameworthiness proportionality applies not only
to varying punishment according to level of culpability but also to varying
punishment according to level of cognitive or control incapacity. Thus, even
where an offender may not get a complete excuse defense for immaturity,
involuntary intoxication, insanity, duress or any other excusing condition,
subjects typically would provide reduced liability and punishment to the
extent that such incapacity reduces the offender’s blameworthiness for the
offense.
For example, to examine community views on an immaturity
defense, study subjects were given scenarios where the offender’s age
varied, from ten to fourteen to eighteen years, compared against a control
case of an adult perpetrator.204 The results showed that the younger the
perpetrator, the lesser the punishment.205 An adult gets on average a split
between life imprisonment and the death penalty for intentionally setting a
boy on fire to kill him while he sleeps. In contrast, an eighteen-year-old gets
an average punishment of 25.5 years for the same offense; a fourteen-yearold 6.2 years; and a ten-year-old 11 months. Rossi, Simpson, and Miller
similarly found that punishments varied according to not only the
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consequences of the crime, but also features of the victims and offenders.206
To examine community views on the effect of involuntary intoxication,
one study gave subjects five homicide scenarios where the offender suffered
from the following dysfunctions: high cognitive only, low cognitive only,
high control only, low control only, and low cognitive plus low control.207
Respondents were told that the cause of the involuntary intoxication was an
unexpected interaction between two medications that the person was taking:
a medication to control long-term pain and a medication described as an
over-the-counter drug for treatment of a cold. The prescribing physician had
not mentioned the possibility of drug interaction side effects, and the person
had not thought to ask about them. The results show that people do assess
cases of involuntary intoxication in terms of the degree of dysfunction that
they bring about, and those perceptions of the dysfunctions cause them to
reduce the liability they assign to the person.208 However, involuntary
intoxication only mitigates liabilities; the liabilities assigned are still
significant.209
Another study gave subjects duress scenarios with varying levels of
coercion.210 The core scenario involved an individual who agrees to
transport eight ounces of cocaine for another. The respondents were asked
to indicate the amount of coercion they saw exercised on the person;
whether a person of reasonable firmness would be coerced or induced to
commit the offense; and the degree of impropriety of the inducements that
are held out to the person in committing the crime, as well as an assessment
of the punishment that the person deserves, if any. In the control case in
which the person commits the crime—transporting cocaine—with no
degree of duress or inducement, the liability imposed is approximately two
years. In the high coercion case, an individual with no prior record
transports the cocaine for an individual who threatens to kill his family if he
does not do so. The high coercion caused liability results that are much
lower than the control case, a sentence of just 3.8 weeks on average,
suggesting that the respondents see a considerable mitigation. Also, 50% of
the subjects assigned no punishment to the offender at all. As the degree of
coercion decreases, the subjects produce a liability result that is between
that of the high coercion and no coercion cases.
The blameworthiness proportionality principle also appears in natural
experiments of groups caught in situations of lawlessness. For example, in
the California mining camps claims were marked by leaving tools as
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markers.211 The standard penalty for taking the tools and thereby subverting
the claim was death. In one instance, however, an Irishman and a Dutchman
took some old tools thinking that they were in such bad shape that they were
probably abandoned.212 Their lack of care and attention that led them to
make this mistake—the tools were not abandoned and really were marking
a claim—let them escape the death penalty but their culpability for the
mistake justified some lesser punishment, so they were expelled from the
camp, thereby losing their own claim.213
E. Constructing a Criminal Code
Here, then, are nine core principles that the evidence suggests have
near universal appeal across demographics, cultures, and history, and whose
expression we see in the universal path of child development, behavior
revealed by animal studies, and a wide range of natural experiments of
groups caught beyond the reach of law and society. The nine principles do
not necessarily provide an exhaustive list. One could argue for the
recognition of other core principles that would further fill out the meaning
of wrongdoing,214 the reach of the blameworthiness core principle,215 or the
demands of the proportionality principle.216 I will leave it to others to
determine what additional core principles might exist. Nor are the core
principles provided here stated in as detailed a form as might be possible.
Future research and analysis by others may well allow for greater
specificity.
These principles are not themselves a criminal code but rather provide
the foundation for drafting the core of a criminal code. Thus, for example,
the obvious principle that “wrongdoing includes physical aggression” calls
for the criminalization of the use of force. In codifying that criminalization,
the principle that “greater harm deserves greater punishment” suggests
codifying different offenses of increasing seriousness (“offense grades” in
modern codes)as the harm increases– distinguishing assault, aggravated
assault, and homicide, for example. And societies may come to recognize
other aspects of physical aggression that they conceive of as additional
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harms, such as whether a gun was used (thereby creating greater risks). The
principle that “an actor with no culpable state of mind as to the offense is
not blameworthy” calls for a minimum culpability of negligence or
recklessness, for example, to impose criminal liability for any of these
assault offenses. The principle that “criminal liability should increase with
increased culpability level” suggests that each assault offense be graded
more seriously when done intentionally than when done recklessly. A
similar analytic process would guide the creation of other offenses
suggested by the core principles.
Of course, the core principles do not provide a complete criminal code
for a modern society. Every criminal code should embody the offenses and
defenses suggested by these core principles. However, depending on the
society, additional provisions, especially relating to the definition of
wrongdoing, will be required to deal with wrongdoing that exists further out
from the core. A society with a well-developed commercial and
governmental structure will want to add offenses such as bribery and
corruption, for example. Technologically developed societies will want to
add cybercrime offenses. Societies with migration patterns that leave
citizens living among nonfamily members may want to create privacy
offenses.
Some of these non-core offenses might well be affected by the extent
to which they are seen as analogous to core harms—some corruption
offenses may seem very much like the core wrongdoing of theft, for
example—but each society will need to decide for itself on the proper
formulation and punishment of non-core offenses. But whatever norms it
recognizes, many of the core principles will influence the criminal code
formulation, such as those principles concerning minimum culpability
requirements, minimum cognitive and control and control functioning
(excuse defenses), and blameworthiness proportionality requirements
relating to culpability requirements greater than the minimum and to
instances of partial excuse.
IV. SPECULATIONS ON THE REASONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE
The strong support for the existence of near universal principles of
criminal liability and punishment, even across demographics, cultures, and
eras, presents an intriguing puzzle: How can it be that people with such
varied situations and backgrounds agree on issues that seem so subjective
and complex?
As discussed in depth in The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice,217
the theory of evolution offers one possible explanation. Human success as

217.
Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV.
1633 (2007).

194

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW

[VOL. 14.1

a species came in large part from their sociability—their ability to work
together in a group.218 This success was possible only with group cohesion
and cooperation. And this group cooperation depended upon the group
accepting a set of rules that protected the group members, which probably
meant agreed-upon prohibitions against physical violence, taking property
without consent, and deceit in exchanges. But enforcement of these rules
could only be undertaken by physical violence or taking property of the
offender (or denying him property to which he would normally be
entitled).219 Thus, to enforce the rules required to maintain group
cooperation, the group had to not only agree on some basic conduct rules
but also to agree on what constituted an appropriate amount of punishment
for particular violations. Dramatic over- or under-punishing would tend to
undermine the conditions required for continued cooperative action.
To summarize, if enforcement of the essential norms was not to trigger
further violations and set off a downward spiral into chaos, humans had to
share some common understanding of what kind of punishment was
appropriate for what kind of violation and to mark out this violation not as
itself a violation of the group norms, but rather as vindication and
reinforcement of them. In other words, there was an enormous evolutionary
advantage– indeed, a necessity for survival– to humans sharing a view that
punishing serious wrongdoing was necessary and not itself a new violation,
ands well as a general sense of the relative seriousness of different wrongs
to guide the amount of appropriate punishment.
It has been shown both theoretically and empirically that cooperation
can evolve through several independent but overlapping processes.220 The
one most relevant for the immediate purpose concerns the mutually
beneficial effects of reciprocity: if you share with me today in exchange for
my sharing with you yesterday, we are both better off than if neither of us
share. In social animals, reciprocity can involve such things as alerting other
group members when food has been discovered, sharing food over time, and
supporting a comrade in action against others.
But underlying this rosy picture is a darker shadow. While it is evident
that reciprocators can outperform loners, a cheater—or a free-rider—could
theoretically outperform both if he were able to regularly take benefits
without repaying them. Consequently, an evolutionary arms race ensues in
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social animals between various predispositions toward cooperation and
exploitation. In the end, the most successful cooperators are not those who
always cooperate, but rather those who cooperate selectively with other
cooperators, thus discriminating (passively or aggressively) against those
who are not reliable partners in cooperative endeavors. Put another way,
effective cooperation requires rewarding good behavior and punishing (or
at least failing to reward) bad behavior.
Humans have a universal and uniquely nuanced propensity for
engaging in social exchange. Indeed, gains from social exchange form the
basis of the modern economy and infiltrate nearly every aspect of life, both
in formal markets and in personal relationships. The psychology that
underpins exchange requires deep intuitions and complex computational
capacities to operate.
In particular, one critical capacity for successful social exchange is the
intuition that one should punish individuals who injure others or cheat in an
exchange. If one is engaged in transactions with the same person over time,
then allowing another individual to injure or to cheat without punishment is
an invitation to exploitation without end. Therefore, to be most successful
in social exchange, one must have the capacity not only to detect but also to
punish such persons.
This implies that there might have been selection in humans for the
cognitive mechanisms designed to detect inequities and, similarly, for the
cognitive mechanisms that yield intuitions that motivate the punishment of
people who violate the most ancient and fundamentally necessary principles
of social exchange. In other words, the evolutionary history of social
exchange has likely led to the development of a reliable psychological
system that is able to compute when someone has injured or cheated, as well
as to a motivation to punish them.
This hypothesis, that shared intuitions of justice derive in large
measure from the relentless effects of evolutionary processes on human
brains and consequent sentiments and behavioral predispositions, connects
at a deep level with modern developments in biology and psychology. It
also appears to explain why these intuitions appear to be so stunningly
consistent across our species, so subtle in their complexities, and so nonrandomly focused on the harms to which their attention is particularly keen.
Three different areas of research provide data that are consistent with this
hypothesis: animal studies,221 brain science,222 and child development.223
While no single study or field of research conclusively proves the
evolutionary hypothesis for the origins of shared intuitions of justice, the
triangulation of the theoretical foundations from biology and psychology
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generally, alongside behavioral data in humans and other species, recent
studies of human brain operations, and broad research into the
characteristically human development of moral psychology, presents a
strong case.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXISTENCE OF CORE PRINCIPLES
Whether one finds the speculation of the previous Part persuasive, it
ought not affect one’s conclusions about the existence of the core principles
or of their importance. One might be tempted to consider the core principles
described in Part III as an interesting academic exercise. But as this Part
makes clear, their existence has a wide variety of important real-world
implications. Below are ten examples of significant implications of the
principles’ existence, implications on a wide variety of fronts, including
increasing effective crime-control, limitations and strategies for effective
social reform, the use of restorative justice, doctrinal reform proposals
involving the legality principle, mistake of law excuses, and the recognition
of partial excuses as a mitigation, as well as implications for such diverse
big issue topics as the feasibility of having an international criminal law,
creating a criminal code for an as yet nonexistent population, and even
setting a strategy for meeting extraterrestrials.
A. Credibility Costs in Conflicting with the Core
Existing research suggests that a criminal justice system derives
practical value by distributing criminal liability and punishment according
to principles that track societal intuitions of justice.224 Specifically,
perceptions of substantive justice—resulting in perceptions of the system’s
“moral credibility”—promote compliance, cooperation, deference, and
internalization of the law’s norms. By contrast, a criminal justice system
perceived to be substantively unjust can provoke resistance and subversion
and may lose its capacity to harness powerful social and normative
influence. Subversion and resistance may take the form of either an impulse
toward apathy or an impulse toward self-help. That is, people may turn to
vigilantism in reaction to a perceived failure of justice. More commonly,
people may resist or subvert the system in less dramatic ways. Citizens may
fail to report crimes in the first instance. Witnesses may lose an incentive to
offer their information or testimony. Jurors may disregard their jury
instructions. Police officers, prosecutors, and judges may make up their own
rules. And offenders may resist adjudication processes and punishments
rather than participate in them.
Studies confirm that laypeople think of criminal liability and
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punishment in terms of desert—the moral blameworthiness of the
offender—and not in terms of other principles, such as general deterrence
and incapacitation,225 which have been so popular with system designers
during the past several decades. Thus, people naturally expect that a
criminal justice system will distribute criminal liability and punishment so
as to do justice. If the criminal law earns a reputation as a reliable statement
of what the community perceives as condemnable, people are more likely
to defer to its commands as morally authoritative in those borderline cases
in which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the
mind of the actor. Such deference will be facilitated if citizens are disposed
to believe that the law is an accurate guide to what society sees as
appropriate prudential and moral behavior.
Recent research has shown that even minor changes in moral
credibility incrementally affect people’s willingness to acquiesce, assist,
and defer to the criminal law.226 One technique used in social science
research on such issues is an experiment in which subjects are told of
injustices in the current criminal justice system that they did not previously
know about and are then tested to see whether the new information changes
their view of the system and their willingness to assist and defer to it.
These studies have shown that subjects exposed to unjust cases are less
willing to assist and defer.227 Subjects “who perceived failures in the
criminal justice system were significantly less likely to say they would defer
to the system’s rules in the future.”228 Their willingness to obey correlated
with the degree to which they judged that law to be morally valid. 229 And
exposure to outcomes that are inconsistent with their shared intuitions of
justice increased the likelihood of future noncompliance.230
Unfortunately, studies have shown that current liability and punishment
rules commonly undermine the criminal law’s reputation for doing justice.
One recent study showed that a wide range of modern crime-control
doctrines treat cases in ways that dramatically conflict with laypeople’s
intuitions of justice.231 The conflict exists for such standard doctrines as
“three strikes” and other habitual offender statutes, high penalties for drug
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offenses, adult prosecution of juveniles, abolition or narrowing of the
insanity defense, strict liability, felony murder, and criminalization of
regulatory violations. The conflicts were shown to undermine the criminal
law’s moral credibility with the subjects.232 Previous and subsequent studies
had results consistent with those results. 233 What the above arguments
suggest is that the criminal law’s long-term crime-control effectiveness will
be hurt by rules that conflict with the community’s intuitions of justice. Yet,
empirical studies make clear that current criminal law regularly deviates
from the community’s justice judgments on a wide range of criminal law
subjects.234
Importantly, the moral credibility crime-control project for its part does
not actually demand that substantive rules produce “just” results, in a
transcendent sense, only that they reflect people’s shared moral intuitions.
The larger point here is not that shared intuitions of justice must always be
followed, but rather that, where they are not followed and where the
criminal law’s moral credibility suffers, there can be a cost to crime-control
effectiveness that ought to be taken into account. A system should not
distribute liability or punishment in ways inconsistent with empirical desert
unless there is a clear justification for doing so. Empirical desert ought to
be the distributive default; it ought not be ignored, as it commonly is
today.235
The risks to criminal law’s moral credibility with the community are
likely to be especially high where the criminal law conflicts with the core
principles outlined in Part III. Given that the nine core principles are near
universal in their appeal and foundational in status, a criminal law that
breaches them is likely to suffer the consequences: resistance and
subversion, vigilante action where the system fails to do justice, disrupting
the criminal law’s power of stigmatization, losing compliance in borderline
cases, and undermining a social consensus on what is and is not
condemnable.
B. Social Reform Limitations: Immutability and the Abolitionist Movement
Whatever one concludes from the analysis in Part IV—whether the
striking existence of widely shared intuitions of justice is the result of
evolutionary pressures or is the result of some other phenomena such as

232.
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233.
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234.
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PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE (2006).
235.
See generally Paul H. Robinson & Lindsay Holcomb, Indoctrination and Social Influence
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universal social learning—it is clear that such intuitions about the core of
wrongdoing are so deeply ingrained in humans that they are immune from
the powerful forces of life experience and demographics. If this were not
the case, one would not find the high degree of agreement across
demographics demonstrated in the studies or the other indicia of
universality.
Thus, the existence of core principles has important implications for
social reformers. Given the deep-seated nature of core principles, it seems
unlikely that social reformers can successfully “educate” people out of
them, at least not by methods that a liberal democracy would tolerate. One
might speculate that extreme coercive indoctrination might have at least a
temporary effect,236 but only highly dictatorial nations with little regard for
individual rights would tolerate such practices. For example, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to bring persons to intuit acts that do direct harm
to others in their community as not being fundamentally – in the innate,
evolutionary sense – morally wrong. As the studies referenced above show,
the closer an intuitive justice judgment is to a core principle, the more likely
it is to be resistant to change.
Modern abolitionist movements provide another insightful example.
Much of the focus today is on reforming the type of punishment imposed
by the criminal justice system—doing away with the death penalty237 and
prisons.238 However, some go further and promote the abolition of
punishment altogether. David Garland argues a society that “intends to
promote disciplined conduct and social control will concentrate not upon
punishing offenders but upon socializing and integrating young citizens—a
work of social justice and moral education rather than penal policy.”239
At its core, this proposal argues that we should look for reparation,
restoration, and reconciliation, not for retribution and punishment (“paindelivery”); instead of inflicting penal pain on wrongdoers, we should seek
negotiated reparations for those who have been harmed, the restoration of
relationships between the parties to conflicts, and their reconciliation with
each other and with the community.240
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This is not a proposal that societies will or should adopt, for two
reasons. First, as shown, a large majority of individuals in society would
strenuously resist the abolition of punishment because the impulse to punish
serious wrongdoing is deeply ingrained.241 Second, having punishment
available to administer to norm violators greatly reduces the frequency of
norm violations that occur.242 This Article does not assert that the lengthy
prison terms that the criminal justice system currently imposes on offenders,
coupled with the “prisonization” that is inflicted on offenders in prisons, is
necessary to reduce the frequency of criminal violations that exist in our
society. But it does argue that the absence of any punishment mechanisms
in a society would lead to a set of violations sufficient to threaten the
existence of the society.
Here, it is worth recalling the “no-punishment” experiments described
previously.243 Drop City was a commune in 1960s Colorado which opposed
external authority, power, and coercion in favor of voluntary cooperation
and self-imposed restraints. Any action designed to collectively coerce
individual behavior, including punishment, violated the commune’s
philosophy of permitting “unrestricted individuality.”244 However, once the
commune members had enough of free-riding members like Peter Rabbit
taking advantage and were left without recourse, the founders abandoned
Drop City and the commune collapsed.245
Black Bear Ranch in Siskiyou County, California was another nopunishment commune that seemed headed for a similar fate.246 But after a
series of fights, outbreaks of hepatitis, and a growing proportion of
freeloaders, formal rules were adopted and enforced by required
appearances before the community for open discussion. If the coercion of
social stigmatization was ineffective, the offending member was expelled.
Black Bear commune’s adoption of a coercive enforcement system saved it,
and it continues to exist today.247 All no-punishment communes, like Drop
City, have failed.
To conclude, even if one were convinced intellectually that abolition
of punishment was a desirable ideal, it is a reform that could never be
successfully implemented, and it would be folly to try to do so. We must
face the reality that human beings will demand justice for serious
wrongdoing, and that the absence of a system that allows for the imposition

Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1648, 1686-87 (2019); FAYE HONEY
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241.
See Section II supra.
242.
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See Section III.A supra.
244.
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245.
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246.
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247.
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of deserved punishment would produce intolerable consequences, such as
people undertaking to do justice themselves.
C. Social Reform Strategies: Manipulating the Strength of the Analogy to
the Core
The previous section introduced why efforts directed towards changing
people’s views on matters that are immutable are destined to fail.
Nevertheless, as one moves out from the core, society’s views on an issue
may be more malleable. If a judgment of justice is of a sort that can be
meaningfully altered, a potentially effective method of bringing about such
change could be by manipulating the analogy to a core principle. In other
words, the existence of non-malleable core principles may make them
beyond the reach of most social reformers; but in the hands of social
reformers who appreciate their intractability, reforms appealing to core
principles could be powerful tools for change.
It is possible through public education both to inform people about
negative effects of conduct that had not previously been fully appreciated
and to analogize the conduct sought to be condemned with conduct that is
already seen as condemnable. This approach changes judgments of what
constitutes wrongdoing not by fighting the existing intuition but by
harnessing it, by demonstrating that the conduct at issue really does have
the condemnable character or effect that people’s intuitions abhor. The
stronger the analogy that can be made to a core principle, the more
pronounced the effect of education will be.
Some recent examples illustrate how justice judgments can be
successfully changed by such a public education campaign. For both drunk
driving and cigarette smoking in banned areas (such as in restaurants or on
airplanes), which have been either criminalized or given more severe
penalties in recent years, criminalization was “successful” in that the
community came to think of the actions as appropriately condemnable and
deserving of punishment.”248
With respect to drunk driving specifically, criminalization involved
changing the identity of the “victim” of drunk driving from the driver
himself to the innocent bystander put at risk by the driver’s actions.249 In
other words, the social reformers built up the strength of the analogy
between drunk driving and the core principle that seriously punishes
physical violence. Groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD), formed of mothers who had children killed or injured by drunk
drivers, who were tragically motivated to make drunk driving criminal,
educated the public as to why it was that these actions fit the “moral wrong”
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prototype.250 Holding up childhood or graduation pictures of their dead
children, or photographs of the horrible results of car accidents caused by
drunk drivers, they provided a persuasive message that drunk driving was
indeed conduct highly dangerous to others.
Cigarette smoking was a bit of a more complicated case, but similar in
that it worked by building an analogy to condemnable physical aggression.
Initially, as evidence began to accumulate that cigarettes had remarkably
harmful effects on smokers and that they were for, at least some people,
highly addictive, cigarette sales were prohibited to minors. This was
justified on the basis that smoking was seen as creating risks for the smoker,
but conventional wisdom coded these as risks that adults could not be
stopped from choosing to take, since they were risks only to themselves.251
As the public learned of the potential harm caused by “secondhand
smoke”—smoke inhaled by (innocent) bystanders who were in rooms filled
with smoke—people started to believe that smokers were inflicting real
harm on other, nonconsenting people.252 That is when laws were passed to
prohibit the infliction of these harms by banning smoking outright in public
and private spaces where smokers and nonsmokers congregated.253 The rate
at which the “immoralization” of smoking has spread through society is
remarkable—fueled by the ability of antismoking advocates to demonstrate
the harmful effects of smoking on discreet categories of nonsmokers.254
The ability to replicate the results of these two public education
campaigns in order to change judgments on other actions relies on the ability
to analogize a given action to a clearly condemnable harm suffered by
another person or group of people. The easier it is to analogize a desired
attitude to one of the core principles, the easier it will be to gain society’s
acceptance. The more we see downloading music without a license as akin
to taking the property of another without consent, the more condemnable
such conduct becomes.
The current effort to change judgments concerning “insider trading” is
an example of both the possibilities of and the limitations on changing
intuitions. Insider trading—buying and selling stocks or bonds based on
information that a person has that is not yet known to the public—has been
criminalized. However, despite high-profile prosecutions for violations,
public judgments of the criminality of insider trading remain somewhat
complex.

250.
In 1985, MADD’s stated mission was “To mobilize victims and their allies to establish the
public conviction that impaired driving is unacceptable and criminal, in order to promote corresponding
public policies, programs and personal responsibility.” History, MADD, https://www.madd.org/history/
[https://perma.cc/C8R7-SRKL].
251.
ROBINSON, supra note 55, at 78.
252.
Id.
253.
Id.
254.
Id.

2021]

CRIMINAL LAW’S CORE PRINCIPLES

203

As predicted by the preceding argument, when the action of insider
trading results in the selling of a stock shortly prior to the price of the stock
falling, it is easier for the public to view this as intuitively criminal. This
occurs because a “victim” can be established in the subsequent purchasers
who suffer personal or institutional economic harm. Hence, in the case of
the collapse of Enron, a great deal of attention was paid to the fact that many
employees had their retirement savings invested in the company.255
In the opposite situation, buying stock on insider information prior to
it gaining value, it is more difficult to identify a victim class and thus more
difficult to change judgments on whether such an action should be
condemned. This form of insider trading is some distance away from what
is generally considered a core prohibition, in which one person harms
another. The action harms all other, later buyers of the stock, because the
buying actions of those who bought on insider information slightly raised
the price of the stock at which the later buyers bought in. These later buyers
constitute a dispersed and non-personified class of actors who are harmed
in some fairly abstract ways. Given this, it could be predicted that having
people see this version of insider trading as truly condemnable would be
somewhat more difficult than with selling a stock just before its price
falling.
D. An Argument for the Broader Use of Restorative Justice
The existence of these core principles of criminal law also suggests that
legal communities should be more receptive to the use of restorative justice
processes in addressing wrongdoing, so long as such processes are actually
used in ways consistent with doing justice. Some of the most common
practices of restorative justice are victim-offender mediation, sentencing
circles, and family-group conferences. As long as the group is large enough
to avoid idiosyncratic decisions, there are good reasons to rely on restorative
processes more than we do today.
Restorative processes have many virtues. They can advance several
crime control mechanisms at the same time—rehabilitation, deterrence, and
norm reinforcement—while also providing restitution to the victim and
putting a human face on the offender, thereby reducing the victim’s
generalized fear of victimization and perhaps giving the victim some
appreciation of how the circumstances may have brought the offender to
commit the offense.
Empirical studies have shown that these virtues of restorative processes
are not merely theoretical. After reviewing the studies, William Nugent and
255.
Richard A. Oppel Jr., Employees’ Retirement Plan Is a Victim as Enron Tumbles, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/22/business/employees-retirement-plan-isa-victim-as-enron-tumbles.html [. https://perma.cc/WVP9-UCCE].
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his colleagues have reported a nine percent reduction in recidivism for
offenders thirty months after their initial court involvement.256 Barton
Poulson found that restorative processes also make people feel better about
the adjudication system—feeling that it is more fair and more likely to give
an appropriate sanction.257 Ultimately, the ability of restorative processes to
build the criminal law’s moral credibility and legitimacy can bolster the
law’sability to gain compliance.
Some opponents have criticized restorative justice as being antipunishment and suitable only for use with juvenile offenders and petty
offenses by adults. This view may be understandable given the antipunishment goals of those like John Braithwaite, who originally pressed
restorative justice.258 Braithwaite and others make clear that they conceive
of restorative processes not simply as a potentially useful piece of, or
complement to, the criminal justice system, but as a substitute for it. 259
Further, their version of restorative justice would ban all “punishment,” by
which is meant, apparently, banning all punishment based on just deserts
and instead embracing forgiveness and reintegration.
But the existence of the core principles, intuitively shared by the vast
majority of humans, ought to give us greater confidence in restorative
processes, at least those that involve “sentencing circles” or other group
decision-making systems large enough to embody community views. In
other words, we can reasonably expect that restorative justice dispositions
will reflect the justice intuitions of the larger community and if the process
is properly constructed, need not worry about unjust outcomes.
As discussed earlier, the method of punishment is not a core principle.
One could impose the deserved punishment through any variety of
alternative methods without undercutting justice—fine, community service,
house arrest, curfew, regular reporting, diary keeping, or even good-faith
participation in the restorative meetings itself—as long as the total punitive
“bite” of the disposition satisfies the total punishment the offender deserves,
no more, no less. Furthermore, it is perfectly consistent with assessing an
offender’s blameworthiness to factor in genuine remorse, public
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and sincere apology, and, thereby,
determine the amount of punishment deserved.
Still, restorative processes can be problematic where the decision-
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making group is too small or too unrepresentative to embody the views of
the community, or where the victim is compelled to agree to an unjust result
because of an improper process. In such circumstances, these processes may
systematically conflict with doing justice by giving more punishment, or
less punishment, than an offender’s wrongdoing deserves.
Consider the 1998 New Zealand case of Patrick Clotworthy, who
inflicted six stab wounds upon an attempted robbery victim, collapsing the
victim’s lung and diaphragm and leaving him badly disfigured.260 At a
restorative conference organized by Justice Alternatives, it was agreed that
Clotworthy would not go to prison; instead, he would work to earn money
to pay the $15,000 needed for the surgical operation to diminish the victim’s
disfigurement.261
Requiring the offender to pay the victim $15,000 for the needed
surgery seems entirely appropriate, but such a sanction hardly reflects the
extent of the punishment the offender deserves for so vicious an attack. In
fact, it does not resemble punishment for a criminal act at all, but rather
resembles restitution under civil law. Indeed, many would likely see the
restorative conference as a second victimization—a desperate victim must
agree to forgo justice in order to rid himself of the disfiguring scar the
offender caused.
But how we deal with offenders like Clotworthy is not merely a private
affair between the immediate victims and offenders. There are important
societal interests at stake, which is why we treat criminal cases as state
prosecutions and not civil trials. The opposition of Braithwaite and others
to doing justice is unfortunate because it inevitably produces both political
and public resistance.
Restorative processes, such as victim-offender mediation and
sentencing circles, are wonderful procedures that should be used much more
widely than they are today. First, a good many restorative inflictions, such
as hours of service to the victim, have punitive elements. Second, there is
no barrier to sincere attempts to restore comity between offender and victim
and between offender and society taking place in criminal proceedings. For
offenses in which intuitions of justice demand retributive impositions,
however, people will see justice as demanding those impositions. Through
proper and representative processes, we can put to work the many virtues of
restorative justice practices while also meeting the demands of society.
E. Doctrinal Reform: More Nuanced Application of the Legality Principle
The extent of its commitment to the legality principle sets the United
States apart from much of the rest of the world, although the larger arc of
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history shows most countries moving in the direction of greater legality.
The “legality principle” is really an umbrella concept for a collection
of doctrines, some constitutional, some statutory, and some judge made. In
its original Latin dress, the legality principle was expressed as “nullum
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege,” meaning roughly “no crime
without law, nor punishment without law.” 262 In its modern form it means
that criminal liability and punishment can be based only upon a prior
legislative enactment of a prohibition that is expressed with adequate
precision and clarity.263 The legality principle is embodied in a series of legal
doctrines, including the abolition of common law penal doctrines,264 the
prohibition of judicial creation of penal rules,265 special rules for the
interpretation of penal statutes,266 the constitutional prohibition of ex post
facto penal laws,267 the bar to retroactive application of judicial
interpretations altering penal rules,268 and the due process vagueness
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prohibition.269 The benefits of the legality principle are clear. Together,
these doctrines further the societal interests in providing fair notice;
increasing compliance, such as through deterrent effect; reserving
criminalization decisions to the legislature; increasing uniformity in the
treatment of similar cases; and reducing the potential for the abuse of
discretion.
As I have argued before,270 there are two kinds of legality: When
applied to the criminal law rules that announce ex ante rules of conduct, the
principle promotes the virtues of fair notice and gaining compliance. When
applied to the criminal law rules that serve to adjudicate ex post violations
of the rules of conduct, the principle promotes the virtues of uniformity in
application and restraint on the potential for abuse of discretion.
Yet these aspects of the legality principle play out somewhat
differently when applied to the core principles than when applied to rules
well outside the core. There is little need for special education regarding
core principles in order to provide fair notice. Everyone understands the
prohibition of the core without being told. However, as one moves out from
the core, people are increasingly less likely to know about a rule or its
specific demands.271 In other words, the doctrines of the legality principle
ought to be applied much more strictly and with a heavier hand as one
moves out from the core.
The underlying justification for the legality principle also plays out
differently regarding the principle’s second function: ex post adjudication
of violations of the rules of conduct. Because humans tend to share a belief
in the core principles, there is less danger of disparate application. Different
decision-makers are likely to share the same intuitions of justice on core
principles. Again, however, as criminal law rules move out from the core,
the potential for disparity among decision-makers increases and the law is
in greater need of a guiding hand to increase uniformity of application.
To give a practical example of how the core principles might affect
application of the legality principle, consider the post-World War II
Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leadership. The Tribunal found itself in a
somewhat awkward situation when it came to charging the leadership with
“crimes against peace.” 272 In many ways this charge was foundational, for
by starting the war through a series of unprovoked aggressions, the Nazis
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brought upon the world all of the death and misery that followed.
Unfortunately, at the time, aggressive warmaking was not a recognized
offense under international law.273 By ignoring this inconvenient fact, in
apparent violation of the legality principle, is the Tribunal simply engaging
in victor’s justice? Perhaps not. The fact that the leadership’s aggressive
warmaking was so obviously in violation of the core principles—whatever
the letter of the law at the moment, all humans understood that their repeated
aggressive warmaking is a gross wrongdoing—means that their convictions
were indeed legitimate and consistent with the underlying rationales of the
legality principle taken in the light of criminal law’s core principles.
F. Doctrinal Reform: Recognition of a Mistake of Law Defense
A mistake as to a matter of fact can provide a defense where the
mistake negates an offense’s required culpability. Common law commonly
limited the defense to cases of mistake of fact, but the Model Penal Code
sought to allow a mistake of law as a defense if it negated an offense
element. Even the Model Code, however, continues to otherwise refuse a
defense for even a reasonable mistake of law.274 Model Code Section
2.02(9) expressly provides that culpability as to the criminality of one’s
conduct is never to be “read in” or assumed to be an offense element; it must
be explicitly provided by the offense definition.275 And rarely is culpability
as to the unlawfulness of one’s conduct actually an element of an offense.
This traditional view is captured by the well-known maxim that
“ignorance of the law is no excuse,” and it may make sense when applied
to the core principles of criminal liability. As shown earlier in this Article,
ordinary people do not need to have these principles explained to them.
They understand them intuitively and even at an early stage in their
development. And it may well be that when this maxim was first formed
under common law,276 let alone under Roman Law where it originated,277
the criminal law was fairly bare bones, extending not too far beyond the
core principles themselves.278
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But clearly today’s criminal law is dramatically different.279 Today’s
rules extend far beyond the core. One criminal law scholar has estimated,
for example, that there are now more than 300,000 federal regulations that
can be criminally enforced.280 And, as we have demonstrated in a variety of
ways above, rules embodying the core principles and rules out from the core
stand in very different positions. One might take a different view about
whether the mistake-of-law-is-no-defense maxim ought to be applied
equally to the flood of new criminal law provisions that extend beyond the
core principles.
There certainly has been considerable debate about whether a
reasonable mistake or ignorance of law ought to be an excuse. Opponents
of a mistake of law excuse argue that (1) everyone is presumed to know the
law;281 (2) those who do not know the law are blameworthy for failing to
educate themselves;282 (3) the ignorance-is-no-excuse rule has deterrent
effect and allows criminal law to change social behaviors by encouraging
members of society to acquaint themselves with the laws;283 and (4) a
mistake of law excuse would force courts to answer difficult questions,
specifically whether a defendant was actually ignorant of the law, and
whether this ignorance was reasonable.284
The arguments in support of a reasonable mistake of law defense
include the central principle of fairness and due process, as discussed above.
Furthermore, proponents of a reasonable mistake of law defense refute
many of the contentions of the opponents. For instance, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes argued that the difficulty of administering justice is “no
ground for refusing to try…unless we are justified in sacrificing individuals
to public convenience.”285
by some ‘the rules of natural justice,’ which would have been known to all . . . being charged with one
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There is no obvious winner in this dispute because both sides have
some legitimate points to make. But this is the case primarily because the
debate has been framed as one that treats all of criminal law as the same. If
instead one were to separate the core principles and those provisions closely
tied to them from the criminal law rules reaching well beyond the core
principles, the nature of the debate changes. The arguments for a reasonable
mistake of law excuse become more compelling for provisions well beyond
the core principles, although those arguments may fall flat when applied to
the core principles (and their analogs) themselves. Claiming ignorance that
taking property of another without consent is a crime is not believable. But
it may be entirely reasonable, depending on the circumstances, that
somebody mistakenly concludes that downloading music without a license
or any one of the thousands of new regulatory offenses is not a crime.
This argues for recognizing a mistake of law defense in a case where
the offender has made an honest mistake and a “reasonable person” could
have made the same mistake. The existence of the core principles, indicating
near universal appreciation for the wrongfulness of core conduct, allows us
to comfortably recognize such a defense because it assures us that in
applying the “reasonable person” standard jurors are not all adrift and in
danger of regularly producing objectionable results. A jury of ordinary
people will naturally find it unconvincing that a defendant was unaware that
a core wrongdoing, such as physical aggression or theft, was unlawful, but
will find it increasingly believable as the alleged crime grows farther from
the core.
G. Doctrinal Reform: Formal Recognition of a Mitigation for Partial
Excuses
Current law typically provides a complete excuse defense for offenders
who’s cognitive or control dysfunctions at the time of the offense are
sufficiently severe as to render them blameless for their conduct. Insanity,
duress, involuntary intoxication, immaturity, and various forms of
involuntary conduct are commonly recognized as a basis for a complete
defense in modern criminal codes.286 But the core principle of
blameworthiness proportionality suggests that the criminal law ought to do
more if it is to embody the criminal law’s universal principles.
Where the effect of an offender’s mental illness falls just short of the
cognitive dysfunction required for a complete insanity defense or where the
extent of coercion to commit the offense falls just short of the amount that
would give a complete duress excuse, there can be little dispute that the
offender stands in an importantly different position than one who has
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committed the offense with no mental illness or coercion. The core principle
of blameworthiness proportionality, then, would require the recognition of
some formal doctrine that acknowledges such cases of partial excuse and
provides reduced punishment.
The criminal law has historically recognized the weight of these
arguments but has implemented them in only one instance: recognizing a
provocation defense to mitigate murder to manslaughter, a mitigation that
has been somewhat expanded in some modern criminal codes to provide a
homicide mitigation for a killing committed under “extreme mental or
emotional disturbance.”287 However, the core principle of blameworthiness
proportionality requires formal recognition of partial excuses in the full
range of excusing conditions.
In practice, a mitigation for a partial excuse might be taken into account
by the sentencing judge, or might not. Some judges may have the discretion
to make such adjustments, but others may not because of mandatory
minimum sentences or even the terms of some sentencing guidelines.
Reliance solely upon judicial discretion is also unattractive because it
excludes jury participation in the decision-making. Judging whether an
offender has sufficiently reduced blameworthiness due to a partial excuse
that justifies a mitigation is the kind of classic justice judgment for which
juries, not judges, are best suited.288
Further, as I have demonstrated in a recent law review article, it is
entirely feasible to construct a general mitigation provision that can guide
such jury decision-making, signaling to jurors the factors they should think
about, and increasing uniformity in the application of the general
mitigation.289 Such a system would both provide desirable jury involvement
and reduce the disparity that is inevitable under the current system under
which individual sentencing judges exercise their unbridled discretion
without even a legislative hint as to whether they should even consider a
mitigation in cases of partial excuse.
H. The Feasibility of Creating an International Criminal Law
As previously discussed, a criminal justice system gains many benefits
from reflecting its society’s shared intuitions of justice, including greater
legitimacy and compliance with its rules.290 In contrast, a regime that
deviates from society’s principles of justice is viewed as lacking credibility
and undeserving of deference. This has led some scholars to conclude that
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creating a desert-based international criminal law is, practically speaking,
infeasible. That, they argue, is because people’s justice judgments are
“deeply culturally contingent” and there is “enormous variation” in global
views towards crime and punishment.291
If it were true that there are no universal principles of justice, then
indeed a desert-based international system would be impracticable. Every
international criminal law rule would violate some communities’ judgments
of what is just. Accordingly, any legal regime would have to be local, or at
most national, in scope.
Other scholars have recognized that widely shared moral intuitions
about justice and punishment do exist. However, they conclude that such
consensus exists across cultures only at a “very high level of abstraction,”292
such that it cannot be operationalized in real-world cases. But these
concerns about the feasibility of an international criminal law are warranted
only if agreed-upon principles were exclusively local. The existence of core
principles, which are universally accepted across demographics and
cultures, provides a foundation upon which an international criminal law
can be built. As shown in Part III, there is broad agreement as to the core of
wrongdoing and the relative blameworthiness of offenders. Across time,
cultures, and even civilizations, humans have had similar intuitions on these
issues. This includes factoring in an offender’s mitigating circumstances,
including acting in self-defense, lacking a culpable state of mind, or lacking
sufficient capacity to understand or control one’s conduct.
Focusing specifically on the idea of an international criminal law, Eric
Blumenson argues that:
The complex beliefs that underwrite retributive justice are common
to most criminal justice systems, but they are neither universal nor
self-evident. For example, the retributive imperative of punishment
is suspect or worse in many faiths, senseless according to many
utilitarians, and unduly focused on the defendant and the past
according to some restorative justice advocates.293
It may well be that Jesus Christ might turn the other cheek, but there is
little evidence that communities of any faith– be they Christian, Islamic,
Hindu, or other– disagree with the core principles, calling for punishment
of blameworthy wrongdoing. The evidence presented in Parts II and III
makes this clear. Similarly, it may well be that some academic crime-control
utilitarians argue for different principles, but again, the evidence is
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overwhelming that they are arguing for a position on which most of
humanity has a contrary view.
Blumenson also appears to confound the degree of punishment with its
form. As mentioned in Part V.D, where we urge the greater use of
restorative processes, the appropriate form of punishment is not part of core
principles. Punishment can take various forms that can be entirely consistent
with restorative processes or other ideals. And allocating punishment
according to core principles of justice can further the utilitarians’ goals by
building the criminal law’s moral credibility.
The existence of the core principles suggests that it is indeed feasible
to construct an international criminal law that will have broad support. It
may well be that, to maintain its moral credibility, international criminal law
will need to limit itself to those areas close to the core principles, and at least
for the time being to forgo legislation out from the core on which there is
disagreement. On the other hand, it is also true that in our increasingly
interconnected world, once an international criminal code is established, if
it earns broad moral credibility by initially sticking to core principles, it may
be able to help bring about greater agreement out from the core.
I. Creating a Criminal Code for an As Yet Nonexistent Population: The
NEOM Project
Saudi Arabia is in the process of creating from scratch a mega city in
the northwestern region of its territory to serve as a global hub for trade,
innovation, and knowledge.294 Announced in October 2017, the project is
part of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, a framework for the Kingdom to
diversify its economy and reduce dependence on oil. NEOM, a combination
of the Greek word for “new” and the Arabic word for “future”—as the zone
is called—will encourage Saudis to spend domestically by housing its own
auto factories, hospitals, tech companies, and resorts. More generally, the
10,230 square mile zone will focus on industries including entertainment,
energy, biotechnology, and advanced manufacturing. According to leaked
documents, a huge artificial moon, glow-in-the-dark beaches, flying dronepowered taxis, robotic maids to clean homes, and a Jurassic Park-style
attraction featuring animatronic dinosaurs are among the many futuristic
features planned for the project.295 Its location bordering the Red Sea and
the Suez Canal positions the independent economic zone on one of the most

294.
About, NEOM, https://www.neom.com/en-us (last accessed Feb. 10, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/55FM-XLQ9].
295.
Justin Scheck et al., A Prince’s $500 Billion Desert Dream: Flying Cars, Robot Dinosaurs
and a Giant Artificial Moon, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-princes-500billion-desert-dream-flying-cars-robot-dinosaurs-and-a-giant-artificial-moon-11564097568
[https://perma.cc/F2W8-2DT8].

214

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW

[VOL. 14.1

important trade routes.
The Saudi government, the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia,
and local and international investors are expected to put more than $500
billion into NEOM, with the expected completion of phase one in 2025. 296
Once completed, NEOM is expected to serve as the home and workplace
for over a million citizens from around the globe and a wide variety of
religions, homelands, and backgrounds.297
The territory the size of Massachusetts will function largely as a
separate country. This includes having its own “[i]ndependent systems and
regulations… [to] ensure the availability of best services without social
limitations,” such as its own laws, taxes, regulations, and an “autonomous
judicial system,” separate from the existing governmental framework in the
Kingdom.298 NEOM officials have said its law “will be based on best
practices in the areas of economic and business law, as well as feedback
from potential investors and residents.”299 According to its website, NEOM
will support an “international ethos” with a “progressive law compatible
with international norms.”300 The idea behind adopting international legal
best practices is that NEOM must provide legal assurances for conflict
resolution and enforcement that will attract foreign investors. The city’s
civil and criminal law must also be such that citizens from around the world
will feel comfortable making NEOM their home.
But if the new territory is to have a legal system that will seem
attractive to persons from all over the globe, is that even possible? If so,
what would such a criminal law look like? There is not even an existing
population that one could test to determine shared judgments of justice.
The previous parts of this Article suggest that drafting such a criminal
code—for an as yet nonexistent population—is indeed feasible. First, the
criminal code drafters ought to commit themselves to a criminal code that
has as its foundations the core principles of criminal liability shown in Part
III to reflect what are essentially universally shared principles of justice. To
fill in additional details of a code, the drafters will need to extrapolate from
these general principles and to add value judgments held by the larger global
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community, which may or may not track those of the current residents of
Saudi Arabia.
As demonstrated, the universal acceptance of the core principles marks
them out as different from other criminal law rules. This has important
implications for the drafters of the NEOM criminal code. If the code were
to incorporate doctrines that significantly stray from the core, the risk of
disapproval from some portion of NEOM’s future residents increases. To
succeed in its unique goal of appeasing persons from all walks of life,
NEOM’s criminal law drafters should stay as close to the core principles as
possible. And as they add detail beyond the core principles, they ought to
consult current global views on the strength of the analogy to the core. Do
most people globally see insider trading as analogous to the core wrongs of
taking without consent and deceit in exchanges? If so, then the drafters are
probably on firm ground in producing a criminal code that has legitimacy
and moral credibility with the community even though they still have no
idea who that community will be.
J. Intergalactic Rules of War
Many who have studied the topic have concluded that it is highly likely
that there is intelligent life somewhere in the galaxy, and nearly certain
within the vastness of the universe. Recent discoveries of the conditions in
which life has been found to thrive on our own planet show the wide range
of habitats that can support life. Scientists in the emerging field of
astrobiology now believe that life can evolve in any environment where
there are enough flows of matter or energy to power chemical reactions.
Critics may point out that life on Earth follows one predominate pattern
subject to tolerances of pressure, temperature, radiation, and atmospheric
content, but such arguments speak more to our own biases regarding the
development of life and ignore both the co-development of life and
atmospheric conditions within our biological system and instances of
organisms living in extreme conditions in our own backyard.301 Our “planet
became inhabited as soon as it was habitable. Once the sterilizing impacts
died down, Earth sprang to life—in less than a couple hundred million years,
and maybe much faster.”302 This too leads to the conclusion that where life
can begin, it will begin. The universe is teeming with life, and the very same
forces driving organisms to explore and adapt into intelligent life virtually
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guarantees our inevitable contact with extraterrestrial beings.
If contact with extraterrestrial beings is inevitable, this begs the
question of what our encounter with them might look like. They may be in
search of resources that we have. Or they may see us as a resource. Perhaps
they may wish to exchange resources or knowledge, or simply be curious
about who we are. Either way, the uncertainty around the encounter means
that our first contact with extraterrestrial beings will have some tension
inherent in it. This is particularly so for a species that is intelligent and
advanced enough to make contact with us. Without knowing their
motivations, the risk for a confrontation can only be assumed to be high.
And if they have the capability to harm the human species as a whole, it
would be rational for us to be prepared to attack first, if that appears to be
the only sure way of preserving our species.
But without additional evidence about the characteristics of any such
extraterrestrial being, our best guess may actually be that they would share
some of our interests in peace and against unjustified aggression. If a mutual
interest in harmony could be persuasively signaled and understood, the
tension in the interaction may be alleviated. Preventing a violent conflict
would require that we deal with them in a manner that they will perceive as
fair and just, and avoid conduct that they would see as wrongful.
Given that we are referring to an extraterrestrial species, it might be
expected that they will be so different from humans that it would be hopeless
to try to guess what their rules of conduct might be. But to become advanced
enough to make contact with us, we should actually expect that they are a
species that has similar sociality and cooperation among themselves as we
have. We could deduce from that shared character some predictable values
that they and we would share, and notions of wrongful conduct may well be
one of them.
If it is true that human intuitions of fairness and justice are a predictable
product of our social nature, whether through evolutionary effect as
discussed in Part IV, or the effect of the common socialization that comes
with living in a social existence, then one might speculate that similar
evolutionary effects or socialization experiences may guide the
development of other species that live a similarly social life. As noted
previously, there are significant advantages that come with social
organization. One example is the mutually beneficial effects of reciprocity:
if you share with me today in exchange for my sharing with you yesterday,
we are both better off than if neither of us share. In social species,
reciprocity can involve such things as alerting other group members when
food has been discovered, sharing food over time, or supporting a comrade
in action against others. While social cooperation is better overall than
selfishness, a cheater could theoretically outperform the others if he were
able to regularly take benefits without repaying them. Ultimately, the most
successful cooperators are not those who cooperate all the time, but rather
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those who cooperate selectively with other cooperators, discriminating
against those who are not reliable partners.303 Put another way, effective
cooperation requires rewarding good behavior and punishing bad behavior.
For an extraterrestrial species advanced enough to come in contact with
humans, it would not be surprising that their process of developing a
cooperative society required the development of core principles similar to
those underlying our cooperative existence. Thus, in judging how best to
engage with extraterrestrials and to signal our interest in a cooperative
relationship, it might be best to assume that they too share the core
principles that we accept.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has challenged the standard view that criminal law scholars
and policymakers are free to construct criminal law rules by focusing
exclusively on the criminal justice theory of the day. It shows that this
“blank slate” conception of criminal lawmaking is dangerously misguided.
In truth, lawmakers are writing on a slate on which core principles are
already indelibly written and realistically they are free only to add detail in
the implementation of those principles and to add additional provisions not
inconsistent with them. Attempts to do otherwise are destined to produce
tragic results from both utilitarian and retributivist perspectives.
The article has also challenged the common view that no such core
principles of criminal law exist, that criminal law is something on which
everyone necessarily disagrees because justice judgments are so dependent
on personal and cultural perspectives. However, by examining a wide
variety of sources—including issues on which there is high agreement
across demographics within a society, issues on which there is agreement
cross culturally, issues emerging early in the historical development of
formal criminal law, issues reflected in the universal path of child
development, issues revealed by animal studies, and rules and principles
commonly appearing in natural experiments of groups beyond the reach of
law—the article has isolated nine core principles on which there appears to
be near universal agreement.
One might speculate about why such core principles exist, and the
article does, but whatever the reason—be it an evolutionarily created
genetic predisposition or a process of generalized learning common to all
social groups—the existence of such core principles has important and
diverse practical implications: in suggesting reduced crime-control
effectiveness where the criminal law conflicts with a core principle, in
setting limitations and strategies for social reform, in supporting a broader

303.
Paul Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice
60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1647 (2007).

218

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW

[VOL. 14.1

use of restorative justice, in suggesting a more nuanced application of the
legality principle, in supporting the recognition of a general mistake of law
defense and a mitigation for partial excuses, in assessing the feasibility of
creating an international criminal law or of creating a criminal law for a
territory whose population does not yet exist, and even in planning strategies
for dealing with initial contact with extraterrestrial beings.
The implications of core principles do not play ideological favorites.
On the one hand, they suggest significant limitations on some favorite
progressive goals, such as the abolition of punishment. On the other hand,
they also suggest the recognition of a general mistake of law defense and
formal mitigation for partial excuses, as well as the increased use of
restorative justice. The ultimate goal here is not to promote one political
agenda or another but rather to understand the reality of human nature and
the significant implications it has for the formulation of criminal law.

